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Three experiments examined the relation between working memory 
capacity (WMC) and two different forms of cognitive conflict: stimulus-stimulus 
(S-S) and stimulus-response (S-R) interference. My goal was to test whether 
WMC’s relation to conflict-task performance is mediated by stimulus-
identification processes (captured by S-S conflict), response-selection processes 
(captured by S-R conflict), both, or neither. In Experiment 1, subjects completed a 
single task presenting both S-S and S-R conflict trials, plus trials that combined 
the two conflict types. I limited ostensible goal-maintenance contributions to 
performance by requiring the same goal for all trial types and by presenting 
frequent conflict trials that reinforced the goal. WMC predicted resolution of S-S 
conflict as expected: Higher-WMC subjects showed reduced response time 
interference. Although WMC also predicted S-R interference, here, higher-WMC 
subjects showed increased error interference. Experiment 2A replicated these 
results in a version of the conflict task without combined S-S/S-R trials. 
Experiment 2B increased the proportion of congruent (i.e., non-conflict) trials to 
promote reliance on goal-maintenance processes. Here, higher-WMC subjects 
resolved both S-S and S-R conflict more successfully than did lower-WMC 
subjects. Experiment 3 tested for the generalizability and robustness of the effect 
found in Experiments 1 and 2A. This pattern of results did not generalize to other 
   
task configurations and latent variable analyses revealed that S-S and S-R 
conflicts were task-specific and did not represent stable across-task individual 
differences. Theoretical implications for the relationship between WMC and 
executive control are discussed.  
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
It is probably true to say that our initial specification of the central 
executive was so vague as to serve as little more than a ragbag into which 
could be stuffed all the complex strategy selection, planning, and retrieval 
checking that clearly goes on when subjects perform even the apparently 
simple digit span task. This still seems a sensible way of starting to 
explore working memory, as it accepts the complexities and the ultimate 
need to explain them, while concentrating on analysing the simpler and 
presumably more tractable slave systems. (Baddeley, 1996, p. 6) 
Working memory’s ―executive‖ processes are typically characterized as general-
purpose mechanisms that control and coordinate the activities of subordinate brain 
networks in the service of complex, goal-directed behavior (e.g., Baddeley, 1986; 
Norman & Shallice, 1986). As Baddeley (1996) recognized, however, such broad 
characterizations may offer little more than an ill-specified homunculus that masks the 
extent of our ignorance about the self-regulation of cognition and behavior (see also 
Burgess, 1997; Towse & Houston-Price, 2001). The present work takes a combined 
psychometric-experimental approach toward incrementally specifying the nature of 
executive control and its contribution to working memory capacity (WMC). The logic 
follows Cronbach (1957) and Underwood (1975) in suggesting that psychological 
theories can be developed and tested by considering individual differences in the 
constructs of interest, especially in the ways that they interact with experimental 
treatments and elicit patterns of convergent and discriminant validity in their selective
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associations with other constructs (see also, Campbell & Fiske, 1959; Cronbach & 
Meehl, 1955; Kosslyn et al., 2002; Vogel & Awh, 2008). In an attempt to add specificity 
to the central executive’s nomological network, then, its correlational boundary 
conditions were sought. That is, I explored whether individual differences in WMC are 
differentially associated with the control processes elicited by two distinct forms of 
cognitive conflict. 
Fractionating the Central Executive 
The approach here has some parallels to the fruitful research program initiated by 
Miyake et al. (2000) into the ―unity and diversity‖ of executive functions thought to be 
linked to the brain’s frontal lobes (for a review, see Miyake & Friedman, 2012). Their 
correlational studies have used latent-variable, factor-analytic techniques to indicate the 
individual-differences variance that is shared versus not shared among theoretically 
derived cognitive and neuropsychological tasks (i.e., to demonstrate both convergent and 
discriminant validity). Three broad domains, or factors, of executive functions have thus 
been identified: inhibiting, switching, and memory updating. These factors are partially 
dissociable in their correlations with one another and in their differential predictions of 
cognitive and behavioral outcomes (e.g., Friedman et al., 2006; 2007), indicating that the 
executive control construct is not monolithic. At the same time, all three factors also 
share considerable common variance, and this common executive factor is highly 
heritable and strongly predicts intelligence and externalizing behavior problems, 
indicating some domain general mechanisms of cognitive control (Friedman et al., 2008; 
Miyake & Friedman, 2012; Young et al., 2009). Of most importance here, this line of 
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―unity and diversity‖ work began from relatively informal, descriptive conceptions of 
executive functions and, through individual-differences findings alone, has progressed to 
facilitate the preliminary development of formal theoretical models to instantiate different 
control processes (e.g., Chatham et al., 2011).      
While similarly relying on individual-differences analyses, the present study more 
narrowly examines how normal variation in WMC, as assessed by complex memory span 
tasks, responds to different experimental manipulations of conflict within a single 
response-time (RT) task. Complex span tasks require subjects to immediately recall short 
lists of items that are interleaved with an unrelated processing task. These tasks are of 
theoretical interest because their performance predicts a variety of important cognitive 
capabilities, such as reading comprehension (e.g., Daneman & Carpenter, 1980; McVay 
& Kane, 2012), learning (Kyllonen & Stephens, 1990; Shute, 1991), multitasking (e.g., 
Bühner, König, Pick, & Krumm, 2006; Hambrick, Oswald, Darowski, Rench, & Brou, 
2010), and reasoning through novel intellectual problems (e.g., Kane, Hambrick, & 
Conway, 2005; Oberauer, Schulze, Wilhelm, & Süß, 2005). As well, normal variation in 
WMC predicts how well people perform seemingly simple attention-control tasks, such 
as dichotic listening and antisaccade (e.g., Colflesh & Conway, 2007; Conway, Cowan, 
& Bunting, 2001; Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 
2004). The apparent generality of WMC’s predictive power, and its association with 
lower-level attention capabilities, has led some theorists to propose that a small number 
of domain-free attention or executive functions largely drive WMC variation and its 
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covariation with other abilities (e.g., Barrouillet & Camos, 2012; Engle & Kane, 2004; 
Hasher, Lustig, & Zacks, 2007).  
Consistent with the Miyake-Friedman ―unity and diversity‖ findings described 
above (e.g., Miyake et al., 2000; Miyake & Friedman, 2012), recent individual-
differences research indicates that WMC variation and covariation may fundamentally 
reflect a number of core abilities beyond attention control (e.g., Unsworth & Engle, 
2007a, 2007b; Unsworth & Spillers, 2010), and that WMC correlates selectively with 
only some attentional-control processes. Many studies have yielded associations between 
WMC measures and attention tasks that elicit some form of conflict between target 
versus distractor stimuli, or between habitual versus required responses (e.g., Ahmed & 
de Fockert, 2012; Bleckely, Durso, Crutchfield, Engle, & Khanna, 2003; Colzato, Spapé, 
Pannebakker, & Hommel, 2007; Conway et al., 2001; Heitz & Engle, 2007; Hutchinson, 
2011; Kane & Engle, 2003; Long & Prat, 2002; McVay & Kane, 2009; Meier & Kane, 
2013; Morey et al., 2012; Redick & Engle, 2006; Unsworth et al., 2004; but see Keye, 
Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009; Redick, Calvo, Gay, & Engle, 2011). In 
sharp contrast, WMC does not appear to correlate with performance of prototypical 
visual search tasks – even those thought to involve top-down influences (Kane, Poole, 
Tuholski, & Engle, 2006; Poole & Kane, 2009; Sobel, Gerrie, Poole, & Kane, 2007) – 
unless those tasks are modified to require subjects to restrict search to only particular 
locations or subtle stimulus dimensions (Poole & Kane, 2009; Sobel et al., 2007). 
Similarly, in the auditory domain, a meta-analysis conducted by Sorqvist et al. (2013) 
provides evidence for a dissociation between WMC variation and two types of auditory 
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distraction. WMC appears to be uniquely related to oddball auditory distractions (with 
higher-WMC subjects showing less of a cost to the oddball distraction), but it does not 
correlate with susceptibility to more continuous forms of auditory distraction. 
 So, WMC does not predict performance in all varieties of attention-control tasks. 
Findings like these, which point to the discriminant validity of WMC, are especially 
important for specifying the executive-control construct. Through an inductive process of 
identifying boundary conditions to the association between WMC and attention control, 
we may eventually reverse-engineer the central executive to gain traction regarding the 
specific control processes it encompasses and how these processes relate to broader 
cognitive abilities.  
Specifying the Executive Attention Account of WMC 
In addition to the attentional control tasks mentioned above that are sensitive to 
WMC variation (i.e., dichotic listening, antisaccade, visual search, and auditory 
distraction), research into the executive attention account of WMC has focused on the 
relation between WMC measures and executive-control tasks that elicit cognitive 
conflict, such as Stroop (1935) and flanker (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974) tasks. These tasks 
demand control, in part, by requiring the flexible regulation of behavior in the pursuit of 
endogenous goals (Egner, 2008), typically by presenting subjects with multiple sources 
of information, some task-relevant and some irrelevant. When relevant and irrelevant task 
information suggest competing responses, cognitive conflict is generated. The general 
pattern of results from investigations of the relation between WMC and cognitive control 
is that the higher the subject’s WMC, the better he or she performs on cognitive control 
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measures. According to the executive attention account, WMC counters interference in 
two ways (Engle & Kane, 2004; Kane & Engle, 2003; Kane et al., 2007; Unsworth, 
Spillers, Brewer, & McMillan, 2011). It has been hypothesized that higher WMC is 
associated with both a superior ability to proactively keep task goals accessible (i.e., 
resist lapses of attention) and to reactively resolve cognitive conflict (i.e., resolve 
interference online). In some popular models of cognitive control, goal maintenance and 
conflict resolution processes are intimately connected with bi-directional communication 
between the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC; primarily associated with conflict resolution) 
and lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) regions thought to be the seat of goal maintenance 
(Botvinick et al., 2001; Braver, Gray, & Burgess, 2007). In these models, effective goal 
maintenance can eliminate the need for conflict resolution because if the goal of the task 
if optimally maintained and the person performing the task only attends to information 
dictated by task instructions, conflict will be precluded. Additionally, if a lot of conflict is 
experienced the ACC can signal the PFC to increase the activation of the goal. The 
proposal of how WMC interfaces with cognitive conflict put forth with the executive 
attention account differs from this integrated account and suggests that goal maintenance 
and conflict resolution are separable somewhat independent processes through which 
WMC impacts performance. Here, the focus is primarily on the latter factor of in-the-
moment conflict resolution.   
Executive control (or ―cognitive control‖) is a broad, arguably ambiguous 
construct (Braver et al., 2007; Funes, Lupianez, & Humphrey, 2010a) that refers to 
mental processes ostensibly operating from perception to action. Therefore, linking 
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WMC to cognitive control allows WMC many possible entry points into information 
processing. To move WMC theory forward, we must further specify how WMC works to 
resolve cognitive conflict. To understand how WMC impacts performance (and to better 
understand cognitive control, itself), it should be helpful to decompose cognitive-control 
tasks into yet smaller components that more clearly map onto aspects (or stages) of 
information processing, analogous to Baddeley’s (1996) call and effort to ―fractionate‖ 
the central executive component of the working memory system. 
The Dimensional Overlap Taxonomy 
Kornblum’s dimensional overlap taxonomy (Kornblum, 1992; Kornblum, 
Hasbroucq, & Osman, 1990) provides a potential blueprint for decomposing cognitive-
control tasks into separable processing elements. Tasks that provide conflicting 
information about what stimulus or response is the target on a given trial are often called 
cognitive-control tasks because control is presumably needed to counter the interference 
they elicit. According to Kornblum, the strength of the conflict experienced by a subject 
is the result of the degree to which opposing task dimensions overlap. Here, overlap 
refers to how perceptually, conceptually, or structurally similar the sets (i.e., the entire 
stimulus and response sets) and the elements (i.e., individual items within the stimulus 
and response sets) are to one another (Kornblum & Lee, 1995). That is, the more overlap 
there is among conflicting task sets and elements, the more the irrelevant task element 
(i.e., the feature that provides information that will lead to an incorrect response) will 
disrupt performance.  
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Kornblum’s dimensional overlap taxonomy distinguishes choice-RT tasks based 
not on conflict strength, but rather on the task dimensions that provide the conflicting 
information. Conflict may arise between relevant and irrelevant stimulus dimensions (S-S 
conflict), between irrelevant stimulus and relevant response dimensions (S-R conflict), or 
between irrelevant stimulus dimensions and both relevant stimulus and response 
dimensions (S-S plus S-R conflict). Information processing is often characterized by at 
least three broad (and further decomposable) stages: stimulus identification, response 
selection, and motor execution (e.g., Proctor & Vu, 2003). Accordingly, different types 
and combinations of dimensional overlap create different processing problems: S-S 
conflict impedes stimulus selection and/or identification, whereas S-R conflict interferes 
with response selection and/or motor execution. 
To test whether S-S and S-R conflicts are independent of each other, Kornblum 
(1994) had subjects respond to stimuli that varied on relevant stimulus, irrelevant 
stimulus, and response dimensions. Color words or neutral words appeared in the center 
of a rectangle, which was divided into colored (red or green) and dark halves. The color 
of the rectangle was the relevant stimulus dimension, whereas words and the side of 
rectangle that was colored (left, right, top, and bottom) were irrelevant. Subjects 
responded to color by pressing left or right keys (e.g., left key for a red patch), and 
completed four conflict-type blocks: pure S-S (color word was congruent or incongruent 
with the color patch; the color patch was presented on the top or bottom of the rectangle, 
making these neutral trials on the S-R dimension), pure S-R (color patch location was 
congruent or incongruent with the left-right response; the words were color-neutral), 
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mixed S-S and S-R (presenting both S-S-only and S-R-only trials), and a combined-type 
S-S/S-R block where the irrelevant stimulus dimension overlapped with both the relevant 
stimulus dimension and the response. Kornblum found that S-S and S-R effects were 
additive on trials that contained both, and interpreted this as support for independence of 
S-S and S-R conflict (but see Hommel, 1997).  
Additional behavioral evidence for the utility of the dimensional overlap 
taxonomy comes from investigations of congruency-sequence effects, in which the prior 
trial’s congruency modifies the magnitude of the present trial’s congruency effect (for a 
review see Egner, 2007). Funes, Lupianez, and Humphrey (2010a, 2010b) had subjects 
perform a series of mixed S-S and S-R trials (with some trials being congruent and others 
incongruent). Carry-over effects of control were conflict-specific: S-S interference was 
reduced after incongruent S-S trials but not after incongruent S-R trials (and vice versa), 
suggesting that the control processes initiated by the preceding incongruent trial were 
specialized for responding to that particular type of conflict (see also Verbruggen, 
Liefooghe, Notebaert, & Vandierendonck, 2005, Experiment 2). Time-course data also 
suggest distinct origins for S-S and S-R conflict, as S-R interference tends to decrease, 
whereas S-S interference tends to increase, as response times get longer (Pratte, Rouder, 
Morey, & Feng, 2010). Finally, neuroimaging data further suggest S-S versus S-R 
dissociations, with hemodynamic responses in parietal cortex areas particularly 
associated with S-S conflict, and activity in the motor cortex more strongly associated 
with S-R conflict (Egner, Delano, & Hirsch, 2007; Liston, Matalon, Hare, Davidson, & 
Casey, 2006; Liu, Banich, Jacobsen, & Tanabe, 2004). Here, then, I propose that (and 
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subsequently test whether) the dimensional overlap taxonomy may help specify the 
executive-control processes that are related to WMC. 
Dimensional Overlap and WMC 
Higher-WMC subjects resolve interference from Stroop color-words more quickly 
than do lower-WMC subjects in tasks that present a high proportion of incongruent trials 
(Kane & Engle, 2003; Long & Prat, 2002; Meier & Kane, 2013). These findings suggest 
that WMC affects performance, in part, through conflict-resolution processes (the 
accuracy advantage that higher-WMC subjects show in low-incongruency Stroop tasks is 
argued to reflect, in part, goal-maintenance abilities; e.g., Hutchison, 2011; Kane & 
Engle, 2003). According to the Dimensional Overlap taxonomy, the color-word Stroop 
task presents both S-S and S-R conflict: The irrelevant stimulus dimension (word 
identity) overlaps with both the relevant stimulus dimension (word color; providing S-S 
conflict) and the response dimension (naming the color aloud; providing S-R conflict). 
Given the Stroop task’s complex structure involving both S-S and S-R conflict, prior 
WMC-related findings have an ambiguous locus. That is, it is unclear if stimulus-
selection and identification processes, or response-selection processes, or both, enable 
higher-WMC subjects to achieve superior performance to lower-WMC subjects.  
Some light may be shed on the contributions of stimulus selection by examining 
WMC correlations with purer S-S interference tasks. In fact, higher-WMC subjects 
exhibit less interference from conflicting task elements in an Eriksen-type flanker task 
than do lower-WMC subjects (Heitz & Engle, 2007; Redick & Engle, 2006; but see 
Keye, Wilhelm, Oberauer, & van Ravenzwaaij, 2009). In the Kornblum taxonomy, the 
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typical flanker task is an S-S conflict task, because conflict is generated when response-
irrelevant stimulus information (i.e., flankers) provides information opposed to the 
information carried by the target representation. Here, then, it is argued that the conflict is 
generated by the overlap and conflicting nature of relevant and irrelevant stimulus 
features. The data thus suggest that higher-WMC subjects achieve better cognitive 
control, in part, because they are able to resolve conflict between stimulus dimensions 
better than are lower-WMC subjects. However, we cannot yet be sure that higher-WMC 
subjects’ superior performance is the result of better S-S interference resolution. It 
remains possible that, at stimulus identification and selection, both lower and higher-
WMC subjects allow the same information (both task relevant and conflicting) into the 
processing stream, but then higher-WMC subjects are better able to resolve the conflict at 
the subsequent response-selection stage (or some intermediate stage). Stated differently, 
although conflict originates in an S-S task from the overlapping stimulus dimensions 
between targets and distractors, performance differences can be achieved by either 
blocking this conflicting information from further processing (i.e., ―early,‖ at stimulus 
identification and selection) or by more efficiently resolving the resulting conflict from 
the distractor information after it has entered the system (i.e., ―late,‖ at response 
selection). This ambiguity is the product of the information-processing sequence where 
stimulus-identification processes must happen before response-selection processes. 
Therefore, by exclusively examining individual differences in a traditional flanker task, it 
still cannot be determined with great confidence what higher-WMC subjects do to 
achieve their superior performance. It should also be noted that recent work by Keye and 
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colleagues (Keye et al., 2009) has reported null relations between WMC and interference 
in flanker tasks, and so earlier work on WMC-flanker task performance may have 
overestimated the relation.  
In order to most effectively discriminate between the contributions of stimulus-
identification and response-selection processes to the associations between WMC and 
conflict tasks, we should compare conflict performance on S-S-type trials to performance 
on trials that present only S-R interference. Then, via subtractive logic (Donders, 1869), 
we may judge how WMC impacts performance. More precisely, if WMC-related 
differences were found in an S-S conflict task, but not in a task that presents interference 
only at the response selection phase (S-R task), it would suggest that WMC affects 
performance prior to the response-selection, most likely during the stimulus identification 
or selection processes. 
According to the Kornblum taxonomy, one way to assess S-R conflict is via the 
Simon effect (Simon & Small, 1969), which reflects the overlap between the irrelevant 
stimulus dimension and the response. The Simon effect is typically demonstrated in tasks 
where subjects push a right- or left-positioned key depending on the identity of the 
stimulus (e.g., circle or square), and the stimulus is either presented on the left or right 
side of the screen. S-R conflict is produced because the stimulus location is coded as left 
or right and so is the response: If the stimulus is on left side of the screen, the ―left‖ 
response is primed, which causes interference when the relevant dimension of the 
stimulus actually indicates a right response. The irrelevant stimulus location and the 
relevant stimulus dimension (usually the shape or color of a single object) do not overlap, 
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so there is no opportunity for conflict between these stimulus elements (i.e., there is no S-
S interference). Considerable behavioral evidence indicates that the Simon effect 
involves response selection and not stimulus identification (Acosta & Simon, 1976; 
Mewaldt, Connelly, & Simon, 1980; Simon, 1982; Simon, Acosta, Mewalt, & Speidel, 
1976; Van der Molen & Keuss, 1981). For example, degrading the quality of visual 
stimuli, which should affect stimulus identification, does not affect the magnitude of the 
Simon effect (Acosta & Simon, 1976), but the size of the to-be-executed response set 
executed does (Mewalt, Connelly, & Simon, 1980). Therefore, the Simon task seems to 
provide a relatively pure window into the response-selection stage of information 
processing.  
The evidence for WMC predicting performance in Simon tasks is mixed and 
limited (and seemingly more limited than that described above connecting WMC to tasks 
involving S-S conflict). WMC is uncorrelated with Simon effects when trials are 50% 
congruent (Gulbinaite & Johnson, 2013; Keye et al., 2009; Weldon, Mushlin, Kim, & 
Sohn, 2013) and 75% congruent (Miller, Watson, & Strayer, 2012, who also found no 
WMC effect on Simon-task errors). In an 80% congruent task, however, Weldon et al. 
observed a modest correlation between WMC and the Simon effect in RTs (r = -.22). It is 
notable that Weldon et al. only observed a significant WMC association in a Simon task 
with a high proportion of congruent trials. High proportion-congruency conditions put a 
premium on the ability to maintain the goal of the task because on the frequent congruent 
trials, correct responding can be achieved by either attending to the goal-mandated target 
or irrelevant information (Kane & Engle, 2003); WMC effects in high-congruency 
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contexts may therefore have little to do with in-the-moment conflict resolution. In any 
case, the lack of a relation between WMC and Simon effects under 50% congruency task 
conditions suggests that WMC is not (or is only weakly) related to performance in tasks 
that provide only response-related conflict.  
I designed Experiment 1 to test whether WMC helps resolve S-S interference, S-R 
interference, or both. This was done within a single task to avoid the ambiguities that 
arise when making across-task comparisons (e.g., differences in stimuli or task approach 
between Flanker and Simon tasks). I controlled the influence of goal-maintenance 
abilities and task switching by using a task that, first, had the same goal for both S-S and 
S-R conflict trials and, second, presented enough conflict trials (i.e., 50%) to help 
reinforce the task goals and minimize goal neglect. Subjects responded to upward or 
downward facing arrows by pressing left- or right-positioned keys. All that distinguished 
S-S from S-R trials was the location of the arrows on the screen. Therefore, any relations 
between WMC and a conflict type should reflect differences in conflict resolution 
processes.
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CHAPTER II 
EXPERIMENT 1 
 
Method 
Here, and in the Results section that follows, I report how I determined sample 
size, all data exclusions, all manipulations, and all measures in the study (Simmons, 
Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2012). 
Subjects. Two hundred and thirty six undergraduates (aged 18-30 years) from the 
University of North Carolina at Greensboro (UNCG) participated and received partial 
credit for a psychology course requirement. The goal was to test at least 200 subjects in 
the course of a single semester, and our stopping rule for data collection was the end of 
the semester in which the goal was reached. 
General procedure. Subjects volunteered to complete three testing sessions in 
groups of 1 – 4, with an experimenter present throughout each session to read all 
instructions aloud and to monitor subjects’ progress through the tasks. Only the relevant 
tasks from the first two sessions are described and analyzed here; the other tasks were all 
completed after the present ones, and were designed for other studies by different sets of 
authors (reflecting a mix of attention and long-term memory tasks, one of which included 
thought probes to assess mind-wandering). On average, these two sessions (for subjects 
who completed both) were completed 13 days apart (SD = 12). In the first session, the 
Operation Span task (OSPAN), the S-S/S-R task, and then the Reading Span task 
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(RSPAN) were administered. In the second session, the Symmetry Span task (SSPAN) 
was administered as the first task, followed by the tasks for other studies. Each session 
was scheduled for 1.5 hr. Subjects were allowed to leave when everyone in their session 
finished the final task (for all sessions, no task was begun until all subjects in the session 
had completed the preceding task). Experimenters read on-screen instructions for each 
task aloud while subjects read along silently. Dell desktop computers, with 17 in cathode 
ray tube (CRT) monitors (85 MHz refresh rate) and running E-Prime (1.2) software, 
presented all task stimuli and recorded all responses.  
  WMC tasks. I assessed WMC with three automated ―complex span‖ tasks 
(OSPAN, SSPAN, and RSPAN; Redick et al. 2012; Unsworth, Heitz, Schrock, & Engle, 
2005; Unsworth, Redick, Heitz, Broadway, & Engle, 2009). In these tasks, subjects 
attempt to maintain or recover mental access to memory items while intermittently 
completing an unrelated processing task. To prevent trading off between the processing 
and memorial portions of the task, an individualized response deadline (M + 2.5 SDs) 
was used for the processing portion, calculated during 15 processing-task-only items. For 
the processing portion of OSPAN, subjects verified (via mouse-clicking a ―yes‖ or ―no‖ 
onscreen) solutions to compound arithmetic equations (e.g., (3 * 2) - 1 = 4). In RSPAN, 
subjects judged (via ―yes‖/―no‖ mouse-click) whether or not sentences made sense (e.g., 
"I like to run in the sky."). In SSPAN, subjects assessed (via ―yes‖/―no‖ mouse-click) 
whether or not 8 × 8 black-and-white matrix patterns were vertically symmetrical. 
The memory items in OSPAN and RSPAN were capital letters (randomly selected 
without replacement on each trial from these twelve: F, H, J, K, L, N, P, Q, R, S, T, Y). A 
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letter followed 200 ms after the response to each processing item in the task and appeared 
for 250 ms. After 3-7 processing-letter pairs, all 12 letters appeared onscreen in a grid 
formation next to a check box. Subjects identified the letters presented in serial order, via 
mouse click in the check box. When a subject selected a letter, it appeared on the bottom 
of the screen in the order it was selected (arranged left to right). Subjects were instructed 
to click on a ―blank‖ button on the screen for forgotten letters, to preserve item order. 
Pressing the blank button placed a dash in the array of letters on the bottom of the screen. 
OSPAN and RSPAN presented each set length (3-7) three times in random order.  
In SSPAN, 200 ms after the symmetry judgment was made, one square of a 4 × 4 
grid was shaded red for 650 ms. After 2-5 symmetry judgment-grid pairs, subjects 
recalled the locations of the shaded squares in serial order by mouse-clicking on the 
squares within an empty grid. When a square was clicked, it turned red with a number 
inside it to indicate its serial order. As with the OSPAN and RSPAN, there was an option 
to click on a ―blank‖ button. The SSPAN presented each set length (2-5) three times in 
random order.  
In all of the complex span tasks, subjects first completed four practice trials of 
just the recall portion (set sizes 2 and 3), then 15 processing-portion-only practice trials, 
and then three combined practice trials (set size 2) of both processing and recall. Task 
instructions warned subjects that they must achieve 85% accuracy on the processing 
portion for their data to be used in the study. Between sets, the programs provided 
subjects with accuracy feedback for the processing and memory portions of the task for 
the last set and also their cumulative accuracy for processing across all preceding sets.  
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S-S/S-R task. 
Stimuli and trial types. I modeled the S-S/S-R task after Liu et al. (2004; see also 
Verbruggen et al., 2005). The stimuli were black arrows on a grey background. At a 
viewing distance of 60 cm, the arrows each occupied approximately 2° × 2° degrees of 
visual angle (although I did not physically restrict viewing distance, I placed pieces of 
blue masking tape on the floor, 60 cm from the screen on each side of each subject’s 
chair and instructed them that their eyes should stay at this distance from the screen 
throughout the task). The target arrows pointed either upward or downward. Subjects 
were instructed to press one key for an up arrow and another key for a down arrow, using 
the Q and P keys on a QWERTY keyboard, which were approximately 15.5 cm apart. I 
counterbalanced the mapping of arrows to keys between subjects (i.e., for some subjects, 
upward-pointing arrows required a left-handed response [Q key] and downward-pointing 
arrows required a right-handed response [P key], and for other subjects upward-pointing 
arrows required a right-handed response [P] and downward arrows required left-handed 
response [Q]). 
Response-Mapping practice trials presented arrows at the center of the CRT 
screen. For S-S/S-R task trials, the arrows appeared in eight different locations around the 
center of the screen. The arrows appeared approximately 2° (at a 60 cm viewing distance) 
from the center of the screen in one of the following eight locations: left, right, above, 
below, left-and-below, left-and-above, right-and-below, or right-and-above (see Figure 
1). Trial order was randomized in every block for every subject. Stimuli were congruent 
half of the time at each stimulus location (e.g., an upward-pointing arrow presented above 
19 
 
the center of the screen; an arrow requiring a right-key response presented on the right 
side of the screen). When stimuli were presented in the corner positions (e.g., left-and-
above, right-and-below), S-S and S-R conflict were factorially crossed.  
Procedure. Each S-S/S-R task trial presented subjects with one arrow either 
pointing upward or downward in one of the eight locations, and the experimenter (and 
onscreen instructions) asked subjects to quickly and accurately press a key to indicate 
whether each arrow pointed upward or downward. Subjects first completed 10 trials of 
response-mapping practice with immediate feedback, by responding to arrows presented 
in the center of the screen. Following incorrect responses, the screen flashed red for 100 
ms. Next, subjects completed 100 response-mapping-practice trials (again, with centered 
arrows) with accuracy and RT feedback provided only at the end of the block.  
Following response-mapping practice, subjects completed 24 practice trials in 
which the arrows could appear in any of the eight positions around the center of the 
screen; subjects received trial-level error feedback (screen flashing red after errors). Next, 
for the actual task, subjects completed four blocks of 120 trials, with short breaks (< 30 
seconds) permitted between blocks. The target arrow appeared directly above, below, to 
the left, or to the right of fixation on 80 trials per block (20 in each of those locations). 
On half of these trials the arrow direction was congruent with the arrow location. On the 
other 40 trials per block, the arrows appeared diagonally oriented to fixation (e.g., right-
and-above; left-and-below) with left, right, up, and down locations being factorially 
crossed. Every trial began with a black fixation cross, in 90 point bold Courier New font, 
for 500 ms, and remained on-screen during the 100 ms arrow presentation. After the 
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target arrow, subjects saw a blank screen for 1250 ms. I recorded responses during the 
first 1150 ms of this screen. After each of the four blocks, subjects received RT and error 
feedback for that block. Finally, subjects completed another 100 trials of response-
mapping (identical to the 100 response-mapping trials completed before the S-S/S-R task 
trials). 
Inferential Analyses 
I used the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, & Bolker, 2013) in the R system for 
statistical computing (R Development Core Team, 2013) to compute inferential statistics. 
For RTs (from accurate trials only), I used linear mixed models (LMM). I interpreted 
parameters — determined by restricted maximum likelihood estimation — with t-values 
greater than 2 as significant; with a large number of observations the t-distribution 
becomes indistinguishable from the standard normal distribution, where absolute values 
over 2 reflect an alpha < .05. I used generalized linear mixed models (GLMM) for 
accuracy analyses, in order to account for the binomial distribution of trial-level accuracy 
(Dixon, 2008). In the raw data, correct trials were scored a 0 and incorrect trials were a 1. 
The betas for the GLMMS are log odds ratios with higher log odds ratios indicating that 
an error is more likely to be committed. In all models, I entered subjects as random 
effects (random intercept only) to account for the non-independence of the data, and 
WMC (centered on the grand mean of the experiment) was treated as a continuous 
variable. 
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Results 
I dropped all data from fifteen subjects (8 who did not achieve 85% accuracy on 
the processing portion of at least 2 complex span tasks [two of these subjects never 
returned for the second session], and seven subjects — identified using box plots — who 
were further than three times the interquartile range from the mean accuracy for either the 
response-mapping or the congruent trials in the S-S/S-R task). Data remained from 221 
subjects.   
WMC screening. The sum of items correctly recalled in serial position was the 
score for each complex span task (Conway et al., 2005); the theoretical maximum score 
was 75 for OSPAN and RSPAN and 42 for SSPAN. If a subject did not achieve 85% 
accuracy on the processing portion of a span task, the score from that task was not used in 
analyses (all data from subjects with fewer than two valid span scores were dropped from 
analyses). I converted span task scores (these raw Ms and SDs are reported with the 
correlations below) to Z scores (using the Ms and SDs from our laboratory database of 
more than 3,000 UNCG students; for published norms generated from this sample, see 
Redick et al., 2012) and averaged them into a WMC composite. The raw span scores 
correlated with rs of .68 (RSPAN [M = 50, SD = 15] × OSPAN [M = 53, SD = 14]; N = 
199), .51 (OSPAN × SSPAN [M = 26, SD = 7]; N = 178), and .43 (SSPAN × RSPAN; N 
= 184). Ns varied due to individually dropped tasks. The WMC composite was unimodal 
and symmetrically distributed (M = 0.08; SD = 0.81; skew = -0.72; kurtosis = 0.01). 
Response-Mapping RTs. On the pre-task mapping trials (M = 448 ms, SE = 4 
ms), higher-WMC subjects responded faster than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -10 ms, 
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SE = 5 ms, t = -2.2). I further divided the pre-task mapping trials to examine WMC’s 
relation to RTs for the first versus second half of mapping. Higher-WMC subjects 
responded significantly faster than did lower-WMC subjects on the first 50 mapping trials 
(b = -9 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.0) and the second 50 mapping trials (b = -11 ms, SE = 5 ms, 
t = -2.3). When I examined only the last 25 trials of mapping, higher-WMC subjects were 
no longer significantly faster than lower-WMC subjects (b = -9 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -1.8), 
but the modest WMC effect on RTs was of similar magnitude no matter how it was 
analyzed. In the post-task mapping trials (M = 464 ms, SE = 4 ms), WMC did not predict 
RTs (b = -5 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -1.0).   
 Response-Mapping errors. Subjects were entered as a random effect and WMC 
as fixed effect in a GLMM predicting errors. Higher-WMC subjects were less likely to 
commit errors than were lower-WMC subjects, overall (b = -0.26, SE = 0.06, Z = -4.2), 
on the first 50 trials (b = -0.31, SE = 0.07, Z = -4.2), and over the last 50 trials (b = -0.26, 
SE = 0.06, Z = -4.2). As in mapping RTs, when I examined only the last 25 trials, I did 
not find significant WMC-related differences (b = -0.09, SE = 0.08, Z = -1.2).   
 Although WMC-related differences in mapping RTs and errors seemed to be 
resolving over the last 25 trials of practice, one might be concerned that overall 
differences in responding to arrow stimuli without conflict might affect any WMC-
related differences in conflict resolution with these stimuli. I thus adopted a conservative 
strategy that used subjects’ centered mean RTs or error rates from the last 50 trials of pre-
task mapping as a covariate in all of the following analyses (I also report all theoretically 
important effects that changed without the covariate, to eliminate concerns about 
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researcher degrees of freedom; Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011). No interaction 
terms with this covariate were included our models. Unless otherwise noted, I entered 
subjects as a random effect and WMC and trial congruency as fixed effects. I coded trial 
congruency as a -.5/+.5 contrast, so this parameter represents the experimental effect. 
S-S RTs. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for Experiment 1. I found 
significant S-S interference, such that responses to incongruent trials were slower than 
responses to congruent trials (b = 38 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 32.8). WMC did not predict RTs, 
overall (b = -3 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -0.7). However, higher-WMC subjects experienced 
less S-S interference than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -7 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -5.1); that 
is, higher-WMC subjects showed a smaller RT difference between incongruent and 
congruent trials. To decompose this interaction between WMC and trial type, I analyzed 
congruent and incongruent trials separately: Higher-WMC subjects did not significantly 
differ from lower-WMC subjects on congruent-trial RTs (b = 1 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.3) or 
on incongruent-trial RTs (b = -6 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -1.7), but it appears that the 
significant reduction in S-S interference for higher-WMC subjects was due primarily to 
better performance on incongruent trials. (Parallel analyses without the mapping-RT 
covariate similarly indicated significant S-S interference [b = 38 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 32.8] 
and a significant WMC × trial-type interaction [b = -7 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -5.1], but 
additionally showed a main effect of WMC on RTs [b = -11 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.2].) 
 S-S errors. Error rates also demonstrated significant S-S interference, with 
subjects making more errors on incongruent than on congruent trials (b = 0.87, SE = 0.05, 
Z = 19.2). WMC did not predict errors overall (b = 0.06, SE = 0.06, Z = 1.1), nor did it 
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interact with trial congruency (b = -0.08, SE = 0.06, Z = -1.4). (Without the mapping-
accuracy covariate, the only parameter to change was for the WMC main effect, which 
remained non-significant [b = 0.00, SE = 0.07, Z = 0.3].)  
S-R RTs. Subjects exhibited significant S-R interference (b = 45 ms, SE = 1 ms, t 
= 39.8). WMC did not predict overall RT (b = -3 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -0.9), nor did WMC 
interact with S-R interference (b = -1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -0.9); in contrast to S-S 
interference, then, S-R interference was insensitive to variation in WMC. (Analyses 
without the mapping-RT covariate showed no change to the parameters representing S-R 
interference or the WMC × trial-type interaction, but the main effect of WMC on RTs 
was significant [b = -12 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.3].) 
 S-R errors. Subjects made more errors on incongruent trials then on congruent 
trials, indicating significant S-R interference (b = 1.39, SE = 0.05, Z = 29.6). Overall, 
WMC did not predict errors (b = -.04, SE = 0.05, Z = -0.8), but WMC did interact with S-
R congruency in the opposite of the predicted direction (b = 0.13, SE = 0.06, Z = 2.3). 
Here, higher-WMC subjects were non-significantly more likely to commit an error on 
incongruent trials than were lower-WMC subjects (b = 0.02, SE = 0.05, Z = 0.4), and 
non-significantly less likely to commit an error on congruent trials (b = -0.11, SE = 0.07, 
Z = -1.6). (Without the mapping covariate, the only parameter that changed was for the 
main effect of WMC, which remained non-significant [b = -0.10, SE = 0.06, Z = -1.7].) 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials. For these analyses, conflict type was 
dummy-coded. S-R trials (arrows presented directly to the right or left of fixation) were 
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set as the reference level and S-S trials (arrows presented directly above or below 
fixation) were the comparison level. 
RTs. S-S trials yielded slower responses than did S-R trials (b = 11 ms, SE = 1 
ms, t = 13.1) and subjects exhibited less S-S than S-R interference when contrasting 
incongruent to congruent trials (b = -7 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -4.2). As evident in the 
significant interaction depicted in Figure 2a, WMC influenced the S-S interference 
difference score more than the S-R difference score (WMC × S-S × S-R interaction, b = -
6 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -3.0). That is, consistent with results reported above, higher-WMC 
showed a greater RT advantage over lower-WMC subjects in resolving S-S interference 
than in S-R interference. (None of these parameters changed in analyses without the 
mapping-RT covariate.) 
Errors. Error rates were statistically equivalent across S-S and S-R trials (b = -
0.04, SE = 0.03, Z = -1.4), but subjects again showed less S-S than S-R interference when 
contrasting congruent to incongruent trials (b = -0.53, SE = 0.07, Z = -8.1). As depicted 
in Figure 2b, WMC negatively predicted interference in S-S trials and positively 
predicted interference in S-R trials, yielding a significant interaction among WMC, S-S, 
and S-R conflict types (b = -0.21, SE = 0.08, Z = -2.6). (None of these parameters 
changed in analyses without the mapping covariate.) 
S-S/S-R Combination Trials  
To analyze the trials that appeared in the ―corners‖ of the display and were 
composed of a factorial combination of congruency and S-S and S-R conflict types, I 
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entered S-S and S-R conflict separately as fixed effects (entered as -.5/+.5 contrasts). 
Data from only the combination trials were included in these analyses. 
 RTs. Subjects showed significant S-S interference (b = 27 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 
23.1) and S-R interference (b = 36 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 31.6) and, consistent with prior 
research (e.g., Kornblum, 1994), these effects did not interact on trials that contained both 
conflict types (b = -1 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -0.3). There was no main effect of WMC on RT, 
overall (b = -2 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -0.6). Consistent with results from the pure trials 
analyzed above and, as shown in Figure 3a, higher-WMC subjects experienced less S-S 
interference than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -4 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -2.7), but this 
pattern did not hold for S-R interference (b = -2 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -1.1). However, the 
three-way interaction among WMC, S-S conflict, and S-R conflict was not significant (b 
= -3 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -1.0). (In an analysis without the mapping-RT covariate, the only 
parameter that changed was the overall main effect of WMC on RT, which was now 
significant [b = -11 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.1].)    
 Errors. Subjects’ error rates showed both significant S-S (b = 0.67, SE = 0.5, Z = 
13.5), and S-R interference (b = 1.14, SE = 0.05, Z = 23.0) but here, in contrast to the RT 
analyses, trials that presented both S-S and S-R conflict yielded an under-additive 
interaction approaching my significance criterion (b = -0.18, SE = 0.10, Z = -1.8). Again, 
there was no main effect of WMC on errors in these combination trials (b = 0.02, SE = 
0.06, Z = 0.4). As in the pure conflict trials, WMC did not predict S-S interference (b = 
0.07, SE = 0.6, Z = 1.2), but, as depicted in Figure 3b, higher-WMC subjects were more 
likely to commit errors on trials with S-R conflict than were lower-WMC subjects (b = 
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0.19, SE = 0.6, Z = 3.1). The three-way interaction among WMC, S-S conflict, and S-R 
conflict was not significant, however (b = -0.17, SE = 0.13, Z = -1.3). (Without the 
mapping-errors covariate in the analyses, only the main effect of WMC changed, 
becoming non-significantly negative [b = -0.03, SE = 0.06, Z = -0.5].)  
Delta plots. Next, I examined whether WMC-related differences in resolving 
interference were more pronounced in particular areas of the RT distribution. That is, I 
tested whether higher-WMC subjects showed an advantage over lower-WMC subjects 
because they experienced less interference on the fastest trials, on the slowest trials, or 
across the whole RT distribution. To accomplish this, I binned all subjects’ correct-trial 
RTs (from pure trials only) separately for congruent and incongruent trials into five bins 
each. The bins were ordered so that each subject’s fastest 20% of trials represented the 
first bin, 2
nd
 fastest 20% of trials the second bin, etc., until I had five bins of 
approximately equal size for each subject for both conflict types for congruent and 
incongruent trials. I then subtracted each congruent-trial bin from its corresponding 
incongruent-trial bin, which left with five difference scores per subject for each conflict 
type. 
S-S trials. For illustrative purposes, I plotted these bins collapsed across the 
highest and lowest third of WMC scores. As shown in Figure 4, the differences between 
higher and lower-WMC subjects were not localized to any specific portions of the RT 
distribution. This observation was confirmed by a LMM with subjects as a random effect 
and WMC (as a continuous variable) and bin (1-5) as fixed effects. Only bin (b = -2 ms, 
SE = 1 ms, t = -2.8) was a significant predictor of the S-S conflict difference score, with 
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interference decreasing across bins. Typically, in tasks that present only S-S conflict in 
isolation, more interference is observed on the slowest trials (Pratte et al., 2010). 
However, when in tasks presenting both S-S and S-R conflict trials mixed within blocks, 
we know less about the expected delta-plot pattern. Here, I did not observe a main effect 
of WMC possibly because of reduced power in the analysis of aggregated data. In any 
case, of most importance here is the null interaction between WMC and bin (b = -1 ms, 
SE = 1 ms, t = -1.6), suggesting that the significant effect of WMC observed in our initial 
non-aggregated analysis above was relatively constant throughout the RT distribution.  
S-R trials. Although my prior analyses showed that WMC did not predict 
resolution of S-R interference in RTs, for completeness I examined delta plots of these 
trials, as well. On blocked S-R trials, where the irrelevant stimulus feature is location (as 
it is here) and the stimuli are presented horizontally, interference effects typically 
decrease as RTs slow (Pratte et al., 2010; Proctor, Miles, & Baroni, 2011). But again, we 
know less about what to expect when S-S and S-R trials are mixed. Figure 5 shows a 
good deal of overlap between the distributions, as well as some separation among WMC 
scores at the slowest RTs. The only statistically significant predictor in the LMM, 
however, was bin (b = 2 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 2.9), with the difference scores getting larger 
as RTs got longer. As in the S-S trial analyses above (and consistent with the null WMC 
effect in S-R interference), WMC did not interact with bin (b = -1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -
1.5). 
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Discussion 
 Here, in a task that presented 50% conflict trials as a means to control for WMC-
related differences in goal maintenance (e.g., Kane & Engle, 2003), higher-WMC 
subjects showed less S-S interference in RTs than did lower-WMC subjects, but they 
showed equivalent S-R interference in RTs. Indeed, not only did higher-WMC subjects 
not experience less S-R RT interference than did lower-WMC subjects, they actually 
experienced greater S-R interference in errors than did lower-WMC subjects (a possible 
explanation of this effect is included in the discussion of Experiment 2A). This pattern of 
results was evident in both pure and combination trials. Clearly, Experiment 1 yielded a 
dissociation in the relation of WMC variation to performance on trials that present 
conflict between stimulus elements and trials that present conflict between stimulus and 
response elements. 
Delta plots did not reveal any localized WMC-related differences in the 
experience of either S-S or S-R interference across the RT distribution. Differential 
slowing in the tail end of the RT distribution, with lower-WMC subjects experiencing 
greater slowing, has previously been interpreted as evidence for WMC-related 
differences in (lapses of) goal maintenance (Unsworth, Redick, Spillers, & Brewer, 
2012). Because I saw no such localized differences here, I interpreted the dissociation of 
WMC with S-S versus S-R interference as being consistent with the notion that higher 
WMC is particularly effective in resolving conflict between relevant and irrelevant 
stimulus features, but is less effective (or even detrimental, with respect to errors) in 
resolving conflict between irrelevant stimulus dimensions and response dimensions. The 
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dissociation revealed here provides evidence for a conflict-specific WMC-related 
individual difference in identifying or selecting among competing visual stimuli.
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CHAPTER III 
EXPERIMENTS 2A AND 2B 
I sought to replicate my novel findings in Experiment 2A, which eliminated 
arrows that were presented in the diagonal positions to determine whether the WMC-
conflict dissociation would be found in a simpler task environment that only allowed 
arrows to appear in four locations (e.g., above, below, left, and right). That is, I simplified 
the task environment as a way to rule out that WMC was somehow related only to 
performance on S-S trials because of the sheer number of stimulus-response pairings in 
the original version (16 stimulus-response pairs in Experiment 1 versus 8 stimulus-
response pairs in Experiments 2a and 2b). In Experiment 2B, the proportion of congruent 
trials was increased from 50% to 80% to bring goal maintenance processes into play; here 
I tested whether WMC would thus moderate performance across both conflict types. In a 
goal-supportive context (like that in Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A) where the goal of 
the task is reinforced by frequently occurring incongruent trials (forcing subjects to try 
and only attend to the relevant stimulus feature), WMC-related differences in goal 
maintenance are minimized. However, in a context where a majority of the trials are 
congruent and allow subjects to respond correctly by either attending to the relevant or 
irrelevant stimulus features, lower-WMC subjects seem to lose the goal of the task 
periodically and thus show greater interference than do higher-WMC subjects when they 
encounter the infrequent incongruent trials (Kane & Engle, 2003). In addition, previous 
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work using the same task as used in the current studies has shown that increasing the 
proportion of congruent trials affects performance across conflict types (Funes et al., 
2010a) suggesting that proportion congruency manipulations impact performance at a 
global level. In Experiment 2B, I tested whether WMC interacts with this generalized 
(i.e., not conflict-type specific) form of control. 
In Experiments 2A and 2B, in addition to testing whether WMC was differently 
related to S-S and S-R conflict resolution, I examined a potential mediator of this 
differential relation: the effect of prior trial congruency on the performance of the current 
trial. Congruency-sequence effects are often used as markers of in-the-moment cognitive 
control (Botvinick et al., 2001; for a review, see Egner, 2007). Using the same task as the 
one in this study, Funes et al. (2010a, 2010b) found a large reduction in interference 
following an incongruent trial only when the previous trial type was the same as the 
current trial type. For example, interference was reduced on incongruent S-S trials that 
followed incongruent S-S trials, and on incongruent S-R trials that followed incongruent 
S-R trials, but not on incongruent S-S trials following incongruent S-R trials and vice 
versa. Previously, I have found WMC to be unrelated to congruency-sequence effects in a 
Stroop task (Meier & Kane, 2013), and this jibes with Unsworth et al. (2012), who also 
found no evidence of a WMC and congruency-sequence relation in a flanker or Stroop 
task and Keye et al. (2013) who found no relations between WMC and congruency-
sequence effects in vertical or horizontal Simon task.  
Other recent work, however has reported relations between WMC and 
congruency-sequence effects in tasks that presented S-R interference, with lower-WMC 
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subjects experiencing a greater change in responses to incongruent trials following 
incongruent trials than did higher-WMC subjects (Gulbinaite & Johnson, 2013; Keye et 
al., 2009; Weldon et al., 2013). My aim with this analysis was to place the work 
presented here in the context of the prior work examining WMC and congruency-
sequence relations and to test whether congruency-sequence effects were responsible (at 
least in part) for any WMC-related differences in the resolution of S-S and S-R conflict. 
Method 
Subjects. I randomly assigned subjects to either Experiment 2A or 2B. One 
hundred and forty-four UNCG undergraduates participated in Experiment 2A and 151 
participated in Experiment 2B (toward partial fulfillment of a psychology course 
requirement, as in Experiment 1). All were 18-30 years old and none had participated in 
Experiment 1. 
General procedure. Subjects volunteered to complete two testing sessions, in 
groups of 1 – 4, over the course of one semester. For subjects that completed both 
sessions, an average of 15 days (SD = 15) passed between sessions for both Experiments 
2A and 2B. I administered the OSPAN task at the beginning of the first session, followed 
by the S-S/S-R task and the SSPAN task. In the second session, the RSPAN was 
administered after subjects had completed two tasks for another study, not reported here 
(again involving a mix of memory and attention tasks, conducted by different sets of 
investigators). I used the same computer hardware, software, and general procedures as in 
Experiment 1.  
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I had intended to terminate data collection after one semester (with the goal of 
testing at least 100 subjects in each experiment), but the number of subjects that were 
tested in the first semester was unambiguously insufficient to conduct individual 
difference analyses. In the first semester of testing, 57 subjects were tested for 
Experiment 2A, and 47 subjects for Experiment 2B. I had to drop the data from five 
subjects in Experiment 2A and twenty-five subjects from 2B because of programming 
errors (details provided below), which left 52 usable Experiment 2A subjects 22 usable 
subjects in Experiment 2B. I therefore conducted data collection for a second full 
semester. 
S-S/S-R task. 
Materials and design. For both Experiments 2A and 2B, I modified the task from 
Experiment 1 by not presenting arrows in the corner positions. That is, arrows only 
appeared directly above or below, or directly to the left or right, of fixation. I manipulated 
the proportion of congruent trials between Experiments 2A and 2B, with 50% congruent 
trials in Experiment 2A (as in Experiment 1) and 80% congruent trials in Experiment 2B. 
Procedure. The procedure was identical to that in Experiment 1. 
Experiment 2A Results 
I dropped all data from twenty-four subjects: 8 who did not meet the processing-
accuracy criterion for the WMC composite (i.e., ≥ 2 complex span tasks with 85% 
accuracy), 11 who were further than three times the interquartile range from the mean 
accuracy rate for either mapping-practice or congruent trials, and 5 who, because of a 
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programming error, received erroneous accuracy feedback during the mapping practice. I 
analyzed data from the remaining 120 subjects. 
WMC screening. I assessed WMC the same way as in Experiment 1. Complex 
span scores correlated with rs of .58 (RSPAN [M = 46, SD = 16] × OSPAN [M = 51, SD 
= 15]; N = 100), .40 (OSPAN × SSPAN [M = 26, SD = 8]; N = 104), and .50 (SSPAN × 
RSPAN; N = 98). The WMC composite mean was -0.07 (SD = 0.84), which did not 
differ from that in Experiment 1 (M = 0.08, SD = 0.81; t(339) = 1.6, p = .12). Also as in 
Experiment 1, the composite was unimodal and symmetrically distributed (skew = -0.44; 
kurtosis = -0.40).  
Response-Mapping RTs. Table 2 contains descriptive statistics for Experiment 
2A. I entered subjects as a random effect and WMC as a fixed effect predicting RT. In 
the mapping trials that preceded the S-S/S-R task, WMC did not predict RT, overall (b = 
2 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = 0.3), nor did it predict RT on the first half of trials (b = 1 ms, SE = 6 
ms, t = 0.1), the second half (b = 3 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = 0.5), or the last 25 mapping trials 
(b = 1 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = 0.1). In the mapping trials following the S-S/S-R task, WMC 
again did not predict RTs (b = -10 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -1.6). 
Response-Mapping errors. Higher-WMC subjects were less likely than lower-
WMC subjects to make errors during the mapping trials that preceded the S-S/S-R task (b 
= -0.17, SE = 0.09, Z = -2.0). Higher-WMC subjects made significantly fewer errors on 
the first half of trials (b = -0.21, SE = 0.10, Z = -2.2), but not in the second half (b = -
0.11, SE = 0.10, Z = -1.1), or in the last 25 trials of this block (b = -0.09, SE = 0.12, Z = -
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0.7). After the S-S/S-R task, WMC did not predict errors on mapping trials (b = 0.00, SE 
= 0.00, Z = -0.5). 
To be consistent with the Experiment 1 analyses (and to facilitate cross-
experiment comparisons), I entered the centered mean RT or error rate for the last 50 
mapping trials as a covariate in the following analyses (and again I additionally report all 
key results without the covariate). 
S-S RTs. Subjects demonstrated significant S-S interference, with slower 
responses to incongruent than to congruent trials (b = 35 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 26.5). WMC 
predicted RTs, overall, with higher-WMC subjects responding faster than did lower-
WMC subjects (b = -12 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.5). Most importantly, however, and 
replicating Experiment 1, higher-WMC subjects experienced less S-S interference than 
did lower-WMC subjects (b = -4 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -2.4). I decomposed this interaction 
by examining congruent and incongruent trials separately. Here, in contrast to 
Experiment 1, higher-WMC subjects were significantly faster than were lower-WMC 
subjects on both congruent (b = -10 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.0) and incongruent trials (b = -
14 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.9), but with a larger effect on incongruent trials. (In a model 
without the mapping-RT covariate, only the WMC main-effect parameter changed, 
remaining significant [b = -10 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = -1.5].)   
 S-S errors. Subjects committed significantly more errors on incongruent than on 
congruent trials (b = 0.76, SE = 0.05, Z = 15.6). Overall, higher-WMC subjects were less 
likely to make an error (b = -0.1, SE = 0.07, Z = -2.1), but WMC did not predict the 
magnitude of S-S interference (b = 0.05, SE = 0.06, Z = 1.0). (Without the mapping 
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covariate, only the parameter value for WMC changed, remaining significant [b = -0.17, 
SE = 0.07, Z = -2.3].) 
S-R RTs. Subjects showed S-R interference, responding significantly more 
slowly on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (b = 43 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 33.1). 
Overall, higher-WMC subjects were faster than lower-WMC subjects on S-R trials (b = -
11 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -2.6). Again replicating Experiment 1, WMC did not predict the 
RT difference between incongruent and congruent trials (b = -1 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -0.7). 
(Without the covariate, only the WMC main-effect parameter changed, and was no longer 
statistically significant, [b = -9 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -1.5].) 
 S-R errors. Significant S-R interference was also evident in errors (b = 1.39, SE 
= 0.05, Z = 27.3). WMC did not predict errors overall (b = -0.8, SE = 0.07, Z = -1.2). As 
in Experiment 1, however, higher-WMC subjects experienced significantly more S-R 
interference in errors than did lower-WMC subjects (b = 0.19, SE = 0.06, Z = 3.3). 
Again, as in Experiment 1, the increase in error interference by higher-WMC subjects 
was the product of a negative slope on congruent trials (b = -0.19, SE = 0.09, Z = 2.0) 
and a non-significant positive slope on incongruent trials (b = 0.01, SE = 0.08, Z = 0.1). 
(Without the covariate, only the overall WMC parameter changed, remaining non-
significant [b = -0.10 ms, SE = .07, Z = -1.4].) 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials. For these analyses, trial type was dummy-
coded. S-R trials were set to the reference level and S-S trials the comparison level. 
RTs. S-S trials were slower than S-R trials (b = 12 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 13.5), and 
subjects experienced less interference on S-S trials than on S-R trials (b = -8 ms, SE = 2 
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ms, t = -4.2; see Figure 6a). Despite the significance of the WMC effect in S-S 
interference but not in S-R interference (see above) that replicated Experiment 1, here, 
the WMC slope for S-S interference was not significantly steeper than that for S-R 
interference (b = -3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -1.2),. (None of these parameters changed in a 
model without the mapping-RT covariate.) 
Errors. There were no overall differences in the amount of errors made on S-S 
and S-R trials (b = -0.06, SE = 0.04, Z = -1.7), but subjects exhibited less interference on 
S-S trials than on S-R trials (b = -0.63, SE = 0.07, Z = -8.9; see Figure 6b). Also 
inconsistent with Experiment 1, there was no significant difference in the relation 
between WMC and interference on S-S and S-R trials (b = -0.15, SE = 0.08, Z = -1.8), 
despite the significance of the WMC effect in S-R (favoring lower-WMC subjects) but 
not in S-S interference (see above) that replicated Experiment 1. (None of these 
parameters changed in a model without the mapping covariate.) 
Delta plots.  
S-S trials. The delta plot for S-S trials in Experiment 2A (see Figure 7) looked 
strikingly like the one from Experiment 1, again showing a slight reduction in the amount 
of interference for longer RTs and a consistent WMC-related difference across the entire 
distribution of RTs. This visual assessment was confirmed by a LMM with subjects as a 
random effect and WMC and bin as fixed effects. Both bin (b = -2 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -
4.1) and WMC (b = -7 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -2.1) were significant predictors of S-S 
interference, but of most importance, WMC and bin did not interact (b = 1 ms, SE = 1 
ms, t = 1.3). 
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 S-R trials. Also as seen in Experiment 1, S-R interference was relatively flat over 
RT bins and substantial WMC-related differences did not emerge over any part of the RT 
distribution (see Figure 8). Again, this is expected, given the finding of no overall WMC-
related RT differences in S-R conflict. This visual observation was confirmed with a 
LMM in which neither WMC (b = 0 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.1), bin (b = 0 ms, SE = 1 ms, t 
= 0.4), nor their interaction (b = -1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -0.6), significantly predicted S-R 
interference. 
Congruency-Sequence effects. First, I specified a LMM with subjects as a 
random effect and current trial congruency, previous trial congruency, WMC, and trial-
type repetition as fixed effects (no covariates were included in this model). The trial-type 
repetition variable distinguished between trials where the trial type had repeated (e.g., an 
S-S trial preceded by an S-S trial) or alternated (e.g., an S-S trial preceded by an S-R 
trial). Current trial congruency and previous trial congruency were -.5/+.5 contrast coded. 
Trial-type repetition was dummy coded with non-repetition trials (i.e., switch trials) as 
the reference level. On trials where the trial type did not repeat, subjects showed slightly 
reduced interference on incongruent trials following incongruent trials versus incongruent 
trials following congruent trials (b = -6 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -2.2), suggesting some 
generality of control processes. However, control-specific carry-over effects were 
considerably more impressive: subjects showed an even greater reduction in interference 
on trials where the trial type repeated (b = -34 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -8.4; note that this 
parameter reflects the additional reduction of interference over and above the parameter 
that was given for the non-repeat trials). WMC did not relate to reductions in interference 
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following incongruent trials, either on non-trial-type-repeat trials (b = -3 ms, SE = 3 ms, t 
= -1.0) or on repeat trials (b = -2 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.4). 
 Next, to examine congruency-sequence effects that might be specific to either S-S 
or S-R trials, and to assess their potential relations to WMC, I specified separate models 
for S-S and S-R repetition trials (i.e., consecutive S-S or S-R trials), with subjects as a 
random effect and current trial congruency, previous trial congruency, and WMC as 
fixed-effect predictors. In S-S trials, congruency-sequence effects were found, with 
interference being reduced after an incongruent trial versus a congruent trial (b = -38 ms, 
SE = 4 ms, t = -8.8), but there was no interaction between these congruency-sequence 
effects and WMC (b = 5 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = 1.0). S-R trials produced the same pattern, 
with substantial congruency-sequence effects (b = -41 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -9.5), but no 
interaction with WMC (b = -2 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.3).   
Experiment 2B Results 
All data from forty-five subjects were dropped: 12 who did not meet the 
processing-accuracy criterion of at least two complex span tasks with 85% accuracy for 
the WMC composite (two of whom never returned for the second session), 8 who were 
further than three times the interquartile range from the mean accuracy for either pre-task 
mapping or congruent trials, and 25 who, because of a programming error during the first 
semester of data collection, only received 20% congruent S-R trials. I analyzed data from 
the remaining 106 subjects. 
WMC screening. Complex span scores correlated with rs of .69 (RSPAN [M = 
44, SD = 15] × OSPAN [M = 51, SD = 16]; N = 84), .41 (OSPAN × SSPAN [M = 26, SD 
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= 8]; N = 91), and .49 (SSPAN × RSPAN; N = 79). In Experiment 2B, the mean WMC 
composite was -0.11 (SD = 0.84) and was unimodal and symmetrically distributed (skew 
= -0.81; kurtosis = 0.15). This mean composite score was the lowest of the three 
experiments. However, a one-way ANOVA (with Experiment 2B as the reference level) 
indicated no main effect of Experiment, F(2, 444) = 2.36, p = .10. More specifically, the 
difference between Experiment 2B and Experiment 1 approached conventional 
significance (t = -1.95), whereas the difference between Experiment 2B and Experiment 
2A did not (t = -0.41). 
Response-Mapping RTs. Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for Experiment 
2B. In the pre-task mapping block, WMC significantly predicted RTs (b = -15 ms, SE = 6 
ms, t = -2.5). Higher-WMC subjects were faster than lower-WMC subjects in the first 
half of the block (b = -15 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -2.4), in the second half (b = -14 ms, SE = 6 
ms, t = -2.3), and in the last 25 trials, but non-significantly so (b = -13 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = 
-1.9). There were no WMC-related differences in the post-task mapping RTs (b = -7 ms, 
SE = 7 ms, t = -1.0).  
 Response-Mapping errors. WMC did not predict errors in the pre-task mapping 
trials (b = -0.12, SE = 0.08, Z = -1.5). There were no WMC-related differences in the first 
half (b = -0.09, SE = 0.10, Z = -0.9), second half (b = -0.15, SE = 0.10, Z = -1.5), or last 
25 trials of pre-task mapping (b = -0.01, SE = 0.14, Z = -0.1). In the post-task mapping, 
WMC also did not predict errors (b = 0.04, SE = 0.09, Z = 0.4). 
42 
 
As in Experiments 1 and 2A, I entered the centered mean RT or error rate for the 
last 50 mapping trials as a covariate in the following analyses (and I additionally report 
key results without the covariate included). 
S-S RTs. Subjects showed significant S-S interference, responding more slowly 
on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (b = 66 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 38.3). Although 
WMC did not predict RTs, overall (b = - 5 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -1.0), higher-WMC 
subjects experienced less S-S interference than did lower-WMC subjects (b = - 6 ms, SE 
= 2 ms, t = -3.1), just as in Experiments 1 and 2A; in decomposing this interaction, 
however, higher WMC subjects were not significantly faster than lower-WMC subjects 
on either congruent (b = - 2 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.4) or incongruent trials (b = - 8 ms, SE 
= 5 ms, t = -1.5), though as before, the WMC effect was numerically larger on 
incongruent than congruent trials. (In a model that did not include the mapping-RT 
covariate, only the overall WMC parameter changed, becoming significant [b = -18 ms, 
SE = 7 ms, t = -2.5].) 
 S-S errors. Subjects made significantly more errors on incongruent trials than 
congruent trials (b = 1.61, SE = 0.05, Z = 30.3). WMC did not predict errors, overall (b = 
0.04, SE = 0.07, Z = 0.5), and WMC did not interact with S-S error interference (b = 
0.02, SE = 0.07, Z = 0.3). (Again, without the covariate, only the WMC parameter 
changed, remaining non-significant [b = - 0.03, SE = 0.08, Z = -0.4].) 
S-R RTs. Subjects again showed significant S-R interference, with slower 
responding to incongruent than congruent trials (b = 82 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 48.7). Overall, 
WMC did not predict RTs (b = -4 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 1.0). In contrast to Experiments 1 
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and 2A, however, higher-WMC subjects experienced less S-R interference than did 
lower-WMC subjects (b = -5 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -2.7). As for the S-S trials in this 
experiment, higher-WMC subjects were not reliably faster than lower-WMC subjects on 
either congruent (b = - 2 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -0.5) or incongruent trials (b = - 6 ms, SE = 6 
ms, t = -1.0). (Without the covariate, only the WMC main-effect parameter changed, 
becoming significant [b = -16 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -2.5].) 
 S-R errors. As expected, subjects committed more errors on incongruent trials 
than on congruent trials (b = 2.69, SE = 0.06, Z = 47.4). WMC did not predict errors 
overall (b = 0.06, SE = 0.07, Z = 0.8). In contrast to Experiments 1 and 2A, here I did not 
detect a relation between error interference and WMC (b = 0.06, SE = 0.07, Z = 0.8). 
(Again, without the covariate, only the WMC parameter changed, remaining non-
significant [b = - 0.00, SE = 0.08, Z = -0.0].) 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials. For these analyses, trial type was dummy-
coded. S-R trials were the reference level and S-S trials the comparison level. 
RTs. S-S trials yielded longer RTs than did S-R trials (b = 12 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 
9.9) and, as can be seen in Figure 9a, subjects experienced more interference on S-R than 
on S-S trials (b = - 16 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -6.7). The slope for WMC in S-S interference 
was not significantly steeper than in S-R interference (b = -1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -0.4). 
Errors. There were no overall differences in the amount of errors made on S-S 
and S-R trials (b = -0.06, SE = 0.04, Z = -1.5) and, as can be seen in Figure 9b, subjects 
exhibited less interference on S-S trials than on S-R trials (b = -1.07, SE = 0.08, Z = -
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13.9). WMC did not predict interference on either S-S or S-R trials (b = -0.04, SE = 0.10, 
Z = -0.4).  
Delta plots. 
S-S trials. I again plotted the difference in RTs between binned incongruent and 
congruent trials. Figure 10 shows that, in this high-congruency context, the difference 
grew between higher- and lower-WMC subjects as RTs got longer. This observation was 
confirmed by a LMM, in which neither the main effect of WMC (b = 0 ms, SE = 4 ms, t 
= -0.1), nor bin (b = 1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 1.2) was significant, but for the first time in 
this set of experiments, the interaction between WMC and bin was significant (b = - 2 ms, 
SE = 1 ms, t = -2.5). This interaction is also consistent with that found by Unsworth et al. 
(2012), who interpreted the pattern of lower-WMC subjects experiencing greater 
interference than higher-WMC subjects at slower RTs as evidence of WMC-related 
differences in goal maintenance abilities. The idea being that lower-WMC subjects lose 
the goal of the task more frequently than higher-WMC subjects resulting in long RTs and 
giving irrelevant stimulus features more weight than dictated by the goal of the task 
thereby causing more interference. 
 S-R trials. Figure 11 shows an ascending pattern of S-R interference, with higher-
WMC subjects experiencing less interference than did lower-WMC subjects across all 
RT bins. In the LMM, only bin significantly predicted S-R interference (b = 7 ms, SE = 1 
ms, t = 8.1). WMC did not (b = -6 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -1.2), nor did the WMC-by-bin 
interaction (b = 0 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -0.2). It is notable in the LMM performed above on 
the non-aggregated RTs found that higher-WMC subjects experienced less interference 
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than lower-WMC subjects, but here in the delta plot analysis WMC was not a statistically 
significant predictor. This discrepancy is most likely due to reduced power in the 
aggregated data used in the analysis of delta plots.  
Congruency-Sequence effects. Here I used the same models as those in 
Experiment 2A. In contrast to Experiment 2A, subjects did not show a significant 
reduction in interference following an incongruent trial when the conflict type switched 
(b = -1 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -0.3). But, as in Experiment 2A, subjects showed a substantial 
reduction in interference following an incongruent trial when the conflict type repeated (b 
= -34 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -5.3), again indicating relative specificity of control. WMC did 
not interact with congruency-sequence effects on conflict-type-switch trials (b = 8 ms, SE 
= 5 ms, t = 1.6) or on repetition trials (b = -4 ms, SE = 8 ms, t = 0.5).  
 I again examined S-S and S-R repetitions trials (i.e., analyses for S-S and S-R 
trials that were preceded by the same trial type), and their associations with WMC, 
separately. In S-S trials, I found a significant congruency-sequence effect (b = -16 ms, SE 
= 4 ms, t = -3.7) and a null interaction with WMC (b = 1 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = 0.1). In S-R 
trials, I found the same pattern, with a significant congruency-sequence effect (b = -33 
ms, SE = 7 ms, t = -4.7), but no WMC interaction (b = 9 ms, SE = 8 ms, t = 1.1).   
Discussion 
 Experiment 2A replicated the critical finding in Experiment 1: Higher-WMC 
subjects showed less RT interference than did lower-WMC subjects on S-S trials but not 
on S-R trials; moreover, higher-WMC subjects showed greater interference in S-R trial 
error rates than did lower-WMC subjects. Experiment 2A did not, however, replicate the 
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significant three-way interaction among WMC, S-S interference, and S-R interference. I 
acknowledge this limitation, but argue that replicating the overall dissociative pattern 
here with consistent parameter estimates across experiments (Experiment 1, WMC × S-S 
= -7 ms and WMC × S-R = -3 ms; Experiment 2A WMC × S-S = -4 ms and WMC × S-R 
= -1 ms) constitutes a successful replication. In contrast, in Experiment 2B, with a greater 
proportion of congruent trials that put a premium on goal maintenance, higher-WMC 
subjects resolved interference better than did lower-WMC subjects on both S-S and S-R 
trials. These findings suggest that when cognitive conflict resolution processes can be 
isolated from goal maintenance abilities (i.e., in designs presenting moderate proportions 
of conflict trials, such as Experiment 2A), having a higher WMC is beneficial for 
resolving interference close to the beginning of information-processing (i.e., at stimulus 
identification or selection), but it is deleterious when interference occurs with the action 
to be performed (i.e., at response selection). However, in situations where goal 
maintenance abilities are especially important (i.e., in designs presenting small 
proportions of conflict trials, such as Experiment 2B), higher WMC subjects show 
generalized performance benefits across conflict types. 
Two recent studies seem to provide a possible explanation on why higher-WMC 
subjects do not outperform lower-WMC subjects on S-R conflict trials presented in low-
congruency contexts (Wuhr & Biebl, 2011; Zhao, Chen, & West, 2010). Both studies 
examined the effects of a memory load on S-R task performance and reported that 
memory load reduced the magnitude of S-R conflict effects, supporting a response 
discrimination account of S-R conflict (Ansorge & Wuhr, 2004). The response 
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discrimination account suggests that S-R conflict is the product of interference between 
S-R rules (e.g., if the arrow is pointing up, press the left key) held in working memory, 
and the stimulus-location codes (left or right) that enter working memory during stimulus 
processing. (In S-S trials, there is no conflict between left and right response codes and 
either the location [up or down] and the arrow direction [up or down], making S-S trials 
fundamentally different from S-R trials). So, by the response-discrimination account, 
loading WMC prevents the stimulus location codes from accessing working memory and 
the S-R conflict effect is thereby reduced or eliminated. Perhaps here, in the 50% 
congruency conditions, higher-WMC subjects’ performance was not superior to that of 
lower-WMC subjects’ on incongruent S-R trials because the higher-WMC subjects have 
additional capacity which allows them to grant stimulus location codes access to their 
working memory, thereby causing greater interference. As another way of looking at this, 
lower-WMC subjects can be thought of working under a constant working memory load 
(e.g., Kane & Engle, 2000; Rosen & Engle 1997) and thus experience less conflict 
because they permit less access to stimulus location codes than do higher-WMC subjects. 
In the 80% congruency condition, however, higher-WMC subjects constricted their 
greater capacity to maintain the task goal thereby occupying the capacity that stimulus 
location codes entered in the 50% congruency conditions. 
Delta plots of the data from Experiment 2A data provided evidence that WMC-
related differences in S-S interference were not localized to a specific portion of RT 
distribution; just as in Experiment 1, higher-WMC subjects did not perform better than 
lower-WMC subjects because of particular control abilities engaged when they were 
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responding especially quickly or slowly. In contrast, in Experiment 2B, the S-S delta 
plots showed a pattern consistent with the ones observed by Unsworth et al. (2012), 
where WMC-related differences in performance increased with response times.  
It is less clear what to make of the S-R delta plot in Experiment 2B, which 
seemed to show consistent separation between the higher and lower WMC terciles, with 
interference becoming greater as RTs increased. The analysis of individual differences on 
these binned S-R difference scores confirmed that interference did increase as RTs got 
longer, but WMC did not predict these difference scores or their changes over bins. 
Therefore, on one hand, Experiment 2B showed that, in a high-congruency task, WMC 
predicted S-R interference in RTs. This is consistent with an interpretation of WMC-
related differences in goal maintenance abilities and it is precisely what motivated the 
proportion-congruency manipulation in Experiment 2. On the other hand, the WMC 
effect on S-R interference was not confirmed by either the patterns visually observed in 
the tercile plot, or in the LMM conducted on the binned data. To further assess the 
strength of the WMC × S-R interference interaction in Experiment 2B, I compared this 
interaction to the non-significant WMC × S-R interactions in Experiment 1 and 
Experiment 2A. In a LMM on all correct S-R trials, with experiment, WMC, and 
congruency as predictors, the E2B significant interaction between WMC and S-R was not 
significantly different from the non-significant interactions observed in Experiment 1 (t = 
1.7) or 2A (t = 1.6). Therefore, although the significant WMC × S-R interference 
interaction is consistent with my a priori hypothesis (and dual-factor conceptions of 
cognitive control; e.g., Braver et al., 2007; Engle & Kane, 2004), I will interpret it 
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cautiously in light of the delta plots and the cross-experiment analysis. Future replications 
of this effect (with this task) are needed to estimate its magnitude. 
My examination of congruency-sequence effects in both Experiment 2A and 2B 
yielded results mostly consistent with prior reports from this task (Funes et al., 2010a, 
2010b), where the control processes initiated from a previous incongruent trial only 
affected performance on the current trial when the same conflict type repeated (although 
in Experiment 2A I found a small and significant general carryover effect [-6 ms] that 
was dwarfed by the effect when the conflict type repeated [-40 ms]). Indeed, most studies 
that have combined two conflict types have found that the cognitive control initiated by 
an incongruent trial is specific to the particular conflict elicited by that trial (Egner et al., 
2007; Funes et al., 2010a, 2010b; Kiesel, Kunde, & Hoffmann, 2006; Notebaert & 
Verguts, 2008; Verbruggen et al., 2005; Wendt, Kluwe, & Peters, 2006).  
WMC did not moderate any of the congruency-sequence effects examined in 
Experiments 2A or 2B, indicating that WMC variation did not predict the reactive 
adjustments to control that subjects made following the processing of either S-S or S-R 
conflict trials. These null WMC effects confirm those reported by Meier and Kane 
(2013), who examined Stroop task performance (reflecting combined S-S and S-R 
conflict), by Unsworth et al. (2012), who examined both Stroop and flanker task 
performance (the latter reflecting primarily S-S conflict), and by Keye et al. (2009), who 
did not detect a relationship in a flanker task. However, the null WMC effects are 
inconsistent with two S-R-conflict-related findings: Keye et al. (2009) found a significant 
relation between WMC and congruency-sequence effects in a vertical Simon task (i.e., S-
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R trials) with higher WMC subjects showing less trial-to-trial adjustment, and Weldon et 
al. (2013) reported the same pattern in a horizontal Simon task. Although this collection 
of S-R findings varied with aspects of the design – null effects here with mixed S-R and 
S-S trials, and significant WMC effects in Keye et al. and Weldon et al. in pure S-R 
blocks, it is currently unclear how these designs would differentially affect WMC-related 
variation (or why design would interact with WMC in S-R but not in S-S conditions). 
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CHAPTER IV 
EXPERIMENT 3 
 
 The results from Experiments 1 and 2 suggested that by evaluating WMC-related 
performance differences in conflict tasks through the lens of the Kornblum taxonomy we 
may be getting closer to a mechanistic account of what WMC allows us to do to resolve 
cognitive conflict. Experiment 3 was designed to further disambiguate the relationship 
between WMC and performance on conflict tasks and to test for the generalizability of 
the results of the first three experiments. Subjects completed single and dual tasks that 
provided S-S and S-R conflict differently than it was presented in the first 2 experiments 
(i.e., varying which axis S-S and S-R trials appear upon and using dimensions other than 
location as the irrelevant stimulus information), and using different ways to respond. To 
this end, subjects completed three tasks that presented both S-S and S-R conflict, two 
tasks that presented only S-S conflict, and two tasks that presented only S-R conflict. 
With these tasks, I tested whether the findings from the earlier studies were dependent on 
the specific conflict type and axis pairings used, the nature of the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension, the response mode, or the dual-conflict task context. In addition, to further 
assess the across-task generalizability of the S-S and S-R conflict constructs I used latent 
variable models. 
In the previous two experiments, all S-S interference was generated by stimuli 
along the vertical axis and all S-R interference was generated by stimuli along the 
52 
 
horizontal axis, and so it is possible that WMC is uniquely unrelated to managing 
responses to stimuli on the horizontal plane. Prior work has suggested that the processing 
of laterality may be special (Pratte et al., 2010; Vallesi, Mapelli, Schiff, Amodio, & 
Umilta, 2005; Wiegand & Wascher, 2005). Both Vallesi et al. and Wiegand and Wascher 
came to the conclusion that vertical and horizontal Simon tasks (i.e., S-R conflict tasks 
with irrelevant location information overlapping with response features) tap different 
underlying mechanisms. In part, both research teams based their conclusions on the 
findings that interference on a horizontal task decreases as RTs slow while interference 
remains stable or increases over RTs during vertical tasks. Moreover, different patterns of 
event-locked lateralized readiness potentials (LRPs; indicating response preparation 
processes; Coles, 1989; Eimer, 1998) were elicited by horizontal versus vertical Simon 
tasks. On horizontal-task incongruent trials, LRPs first reflected activations of a response 
ipsilateral to the stimuli, followed by (correct) activation contralateral to the stimuli. On 
vertical incongruent task trials, no initial activation ipsilateral to the response was 
detected, and only a delay of the contralateral response was found. From these results, 
both sets of authors suggested that the horizontal task taps a quick automatic visuo-motor 
response (perhaps produced from long-term memory) while the vertical task generated its 
interference from a higher-order translation of spatial stimulus codes to response codes. If 
the assertion that responses in the horizontal task are driven by long-term memory 
connections is correct, it offers a potential explanation of why higher-WMC committed 
more errors on the horizontal S-R trials. Recently, WMC has been linked to memory 
retrieval abilities, with higher-WMC subjects showing superior retrieval from long-term 
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memory when compared to lower-WMC subjects (Unsworth & Engle, 2007a; 2007b).  
Because of their superior memory retrieval abilities, on horizontal trials, higher-WMC 
subjects may experience stronger facilitation towards responses ipsilateral to stimuli than 
do lower-WMC subjects. Therefore, counter to the pattern of results seen in Experiments 
1 and 2A, we could see higher-WMC subjects experience less interference than do lower-
WMC subjects on S-R trials that are presented on the vertical axis.   
Moreover, in all of the previous experiments conducted here, stimulus location 
was the only task-irrelevant stimulus feature; thus, there may be something special about 
variation in executive control processes that pertains exclusively to location-based 
information. Tsal and Lavie (1993) found that subjects obligatorily direct attention to 
location information regardless of whether the location information was task relevant. For 
example, in their first of four experiments, subjects saw a letter cue and then reported as 
many letters as possible from a briefly presented (50 ms) circular array of letters. All 
subjects completed three conditions. In one, they reported letters only if the cue was 
presented in a certain location, in another, only if the cue was a certain color, and in the 
last condition, only if the letter met a shape criterion. In all three conditions, subjects 
reported letters that shared a similar location to the cue, even when it was not the task-
stipulated relevant feature; in contrast, subjects showed no evidence of attending either to 
colors or shapes, even when they were the relevant cue features. Tsal and Lavie’s 
findings in this and their three other experiments led them to propose that attending to 
stimulus location may be obligatory and thus ―deserves a special status in theories of 
visual attention.‖ Additional evidence for location-based information being special comes 
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from work looking at the relation between aging and negative priming (Connelly & 
Hasher, 1993), a phenomenon where previously inhibited distractors elicit a performance 
cost when they become targets on subsequent trials. Connelly and Hasher found that 
older adults — a population that often shows working memory and inhibition deficits in 
comparison to younger adults (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988) —were equally as able as 
younger adults to inhibit location information. However, older adults were not as 
effective as younger adults in inhibiting identity information (for a similar result with 
children see Tipper & McLaren, 1990). Clearly, there is some precedence for location 
information to be unique. 
Furthermore, the previous three experiments conducted here found differing 
WMC-conflict relations within a dual-conflict context, where both conflicts were 
presented in one task. Because prior work has suggested that variation in WMC affects 
performance at a global level of task approach rather than in on-the-fly adjustments of 
cognitive control (Meier & Kane, 2013), we may see different patterns of results when 
subjects only see one type of conflict in a set of trials. For example, higher-WMC 
subjects may be better able than lower-WMC subjects to adjust their control settings to 
combat interference when only facing S-R trials, but not when they have to complete S-S 
and S-R trials that are intermixed. That is, higher-WMC subjects may configure their task 
approach at a global level and this setting may be optimally tuned for one conflict type 
but not the other. Below I will describe briefly the three dual-conflict tasks and then the 
single-conflict tasks that attempt to address these questions. 
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First, the joystick replication task was identical to the task in Experiment 2A in all 
regards, but left-right responses were made by moving a joystick instead of pressing 
keys. Second, the axis-shifted joystick task shifted the axis on which S-S and S-R conflict 
occurred, with S-S interference elicited along the horizontal axis and S-R interference 
along the vertical axis; subjects responded to arrows pointing either to the left or to the 
right with either an upward or a downward thrust of the joystick. Here, then, I attempted 
to overcome the confound of the consistent pairings of conflict and axis in the first two 
experiments (S-S along the vertical and S-R along the horizontal). A critical benefit of 
the joystick over a keyboard response is that up and down movements are as intuitive as 
left-right movements; with keyboard responses, the potential awkwardness in executing 
up and down responses could have confounded examination of S-S and S-R across axes. 
Third, the up-down numerosity Task tested whether the dissociation between WMC and 
S-S/S-R conflict would occur when the irrelevant stimulus dimension that conflicts with 
the response was not stimulus location. Here, the number of stimuli presented in a given 
trial was the irrelevant stimulus dimension (inspired by Miller, 2006). To test whether the 
same pattern of results was found when subjects completed tasks that presented only one 
conflict type (perhaps changing how the task was approached), subjects also completed 
an up-down arrows task (S-S trials), a flanker task (S-S trials), a Simon Task (S-R trials), 
and a task that manipulated numerosity to create S-R interference (S-R trials).  
In addition to examining the above hypotheses within each of the dual-conflict 
tasks and across the single-conflict tasks, I used latent variable analyses to determine 
whether the S-S and S-R constructs were stable and distinct across tasks. Latent variable 
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analyses allowed me to test whether the ability to resolve S-S and S-R conflict 
systematically covaried across tasks, that is, whether an individual’s ability to resolve S-S 
(or S-R) interference in one task allows me to make predictions about how they will also 
resolve S-S (or S-R) interference in another task. Models specified separate S-S and S-R 
conflict factors to pool the covariances across tasks (and thereby eliminate task-specific 
method variance). In this way, I tested the robustness of Kornblum’s taxonomy: If 
individual differences in response to S-S and S-R conflict uniquely covaried amongst 
themselves across tasks (e.g., the ability to resolve S-R conflict related to the ability to 
resolve S-R conflict, but not S-S conflict), this would suggest independent conflict 
resolution processes, thereby providing strong support for Kornblum’s taxonomy as a 
fruitful framework for understanding individual differences in the different stages of 
information processing.  
Method 
Subjects. Two hundred and seventy-six UNCG undergraduates (aged 18-30 
years) participated and received partial credit for a psychology course requirement. The 
goal was to test at least 150 subjects, and the stopping rule for data collection was the end 
of the semester in which the goal was reached. I collected data in the Spring and Fall 
semesters of 2013. 
General procedure. Subjects volunteered to complete two testing sessions, in 
groups of 1 – 4, over the course of one semester. In this experiment, subjects were 
scheduled to complete the second testing session exactly one week after the first. On the 
occasions when a subject missed their second appointment, or if a second appointment 
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occurred on a day when school was not in session, alternate arrangements were attempted 
for the subject to complete testing. Two hundred sixty-one subjects completed both 
sessions, with an average of 8 days (SD = 4) between sessions (232 subjects completed 
their second session exactly a week after their first). 
 The order of task administration is reported in Table 4.The same computer 
hardware, and general procedures were used as in Experiment 1, except all tasks besides 
OSPAN and SSPAN were programmed in E-prime 2.0 (Schneider, Eschmann, & 
Zuccolotto, 2002) rather than E-prime 1.2. In all S-S and/or S-R tasks, subjects whose 
error rates were greater than three times the interquartile range from the mean error rates 
for mapping and congruent trials were excluded from analyses of that task to eliminate 
concerns that any results were driven by subjects not understanding the tasks or not 
putting forth any effort. Any additional data exclusions will be reported for specific tasks. 
All conflict tasks were counterbalanced with regards to stimuli and responses. 
Subjects were assigned a counterbalancing condition in the first session, which was 
maintained across sessions to assure consistent mappings between stimuli and responses. 
For example, if a subject was assigned to respond left to an upward pointing arrow in the 
first task, for all of the tasks that subject completed, left and up were consistently paired. 
This was done to control for the ―task switching‖ conflict that might arise if subjects 
repeatedly had to shift S-R mapping rules from task to task. In addition to having 
consistent S-R pairings across sessions to control for carry-over and order effects, I made 
superficial alterations to the appearance of the conflict tasks to distinguish them from one 
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another. For example, arrow shapes and colors and the background-screen colors were 
different across tasks. 
In all conflict tasks, before beginning the testing block, subjects were alerted that 
sometimes relevant stimulus features and irrelevant stimulus features were going to be 
congruent with each other (e.g., upward facing arrows on the top portion of the screen) 
and sometimes relevant and irrelevant stimulus features were going to be incongruent 
with each other (e.g., upward facing arrows on the bottom part of the screen), and 
therefore for best performance they should always ignore irrelevant features (the same 
instructions were used for Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B). All degrees of visual angle were 
calculated from a distance of 60 cm. 
WMC tasks. The OSPAN and SSPAN tasks used in Experiment 3 were identical 
to those used in Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B. In Experiment 3, I also used a RSPAN task 
that had words instead of digits as memoranda. This change was motivated by the desire 
to reduce method variance between OSPAN and RSPAN tasks, which had previously 
both used letters as memoranda, and thus yield a more pure measure of the WMC 
construct. In accord with this goal, I also used an updating task (Oberauer, Süß, Schulze, 
Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2000; Salthouse, Babcock, & Shaw, 1991) to assess WMC with a 
non-complex-span task. 
RSPAN presented set sizes of 2-6 sentence-word pairs. Like the other complex 
span tasks, each of these set sizes was repeated 3 times. The memory items were four-
letter words (randomly selected without replacement on each trial from the following: 
Bald, Cuff, Dunk, Fuse, Glow, Hush, Jolt, Limb, Mole, Nest, Pail, Ramp, Soak, Tint, 
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Wool). All other aspects of this RSPAN task are identical to the RSPAN tasks reported in 
Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B. 
The updating task required subjects to maintain and manipulate (i.e., update) 
information. The updating task differed from complex span tasks because the processing 
task (adding or subtracting numbers) was not irrelevant to the memory items. Subjects 
first saw a horizontal array of 3 – 5 boxes. Each trial then had three phases: learning, 
updating, and recall. In the learning phase, digits (from 1-9) populated the boxes for 1250 
ms serially in random order until a digit has been presented in each box (100 ms between 
each digit presentation). The task instructions asked the subjects to remember these 
starting values. Then, during the immediately succeeding updating phase, at least some of 
the original digits were replaced by another digit for 1333 ms with a plus or minus sign 
(i.e., +2). There was a 250ms break between each update presentation. The subjects were 
instructed to update the starting value by whatever sign and digit occupied the same box. 
That is, if the subject originally saw a 3 in the second box, and then a -1 in that same box, 
the subjects should have subtracted 1 from the starting value of 3 and updated the current 
value of the box to 2. Each trial presented 2 – 6 updates; some boxes were updated 
multiple times while others might not have been updated at all. Finally, during the 
immediately succeeding recall phase, box outlines turned red in random order to prompt 
the subject to enter (via the number keypad) the updated value for that box. Recall 
proceeded until a value has been entered for every box in the trial (i.e., there was no time 
limit for responding). Prior to beginning the task, subjects were told that the final updated 
values were always between 1 and 9. Each set size (i.e., the 3-5 boxes initially presented) 
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was crossed with the number of updates (2-6) to generate 15 trials. Subjects initiated the 
beginning of every trial be pressing the space bar. The dependent variable for this task 
was the overall correct proportion of final box values entered. The trial order for this task 
was randomized once. All subjects were presented with the same trial order.   
This updating task has been shown to be a reliable and valid measure of WMC. In 
three experiments, Lewandowsky, Oberauer, Yang, and Ecker (2010) reported 
Cronbach’s  between .85 and .91. They also found that the updating task loaded highly 
on a WMC latent factor along with two complex span tasks (OSPAN and SSPAN) and a 
spatial short-term memory task (loadings = .79 - .88 across experiments); zero-order 
correlations between the updating task and the complex span tasks were moderate, 
ranging from .30 to .68. In summary, when making a composite WMC score, this 
updating task and the complex span tasks pick up common variance that mapped onto the 
construct of WMC, but the inclusion of the updating task produced a WMC score that 
eliminated shared variance from the common method of the complex span tasks. 
Dual-Conflict tasks. For all tasks designed to measure S-S and/or S-R conflict, 
subjects were instructed to be fast and accurate. Following initial task instructions, all 
dual-conflict tasks had 10 practice trials where error feedback was presented after every 
trial followed by 100 response-mapping practice trials. All tasks were composed of 3 
testing blocks of 120 trials. Half of all test trials were congruent. The order of trials was 
randomly determined for every subject. RTs and errors were the dependent variables for 
all task conditions. 
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Joystick replication task. This task was modeled closely on Experiment 2A. The 
differences between the current and the previous iteration of the task were the response 
method and task length. In Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B, responses were made by pressing 
the Q (upper left of the keyboard) and P (upper right of the keyboard) keys of a 
QWERTY keyboard. In this version, responses were made by pushing a joystick 
(Logitech Attack 3) either left or right. A directional response was recorded when the 
joystick moved 50 X or Y coordinate points from its initial position when the target 
stimulus was presented.   
This task presented 360 trials, making it 120 trials shorter than the tasks in 
Experiment 1, 2A, and 2B. Analysis of the data from those tasks indicated that the effects 
of interest (i.e., interference effects and WMC × interference interactions) were present if 
the final 120 were excluded (making the task any shorter than this results in 
uncomfortably large standard errors of the estimates). All other aspects of this task were 
identical to the Experiment 2A task. 
Axis-shifted joystick task. This task was similar to the joystick replication task 
with a few notable exceptions, the most important of which were that: (1) the S-S conflict 
occurred on the horizontal axis while S-R conflict occurred on the vertical axis, and; (2) 
subjects responded with upward versus downward joystick thrusts to left- and right-
pointing arrows (counterbalanced across subjects). Here, S-S conflict was the result of a 
left pointing arrow appearing on the right side of the screen (or vice versa) and S-R 
conflict came from having to respond to an arrow that either appeared on the top or 
bottom of the screen with a joystick move in the opposite direction. In this task, the 
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arrows were green and of a more rounded shape than those used in joystick replication 
task. The background color for this task was black rather than the gray of joystick 
replication task. Like the previous dual-conflict tasks, arrow stimuli were approximately 
2° of visual angle and were positioned 2° of visual angle for the screen’s center. To 
encourage the encoding of responses as up or down in contrast to forward and back, 
subjects placed the joysticks on a three-inch binder with the raised end of the binder 
closest to the monitor. In this way the joystick responses were literally either up or down. 
Up-Down numerosity task. Here, S-S conflict was created in the same way that it 
was created on the previously described dual-conflict tasks, by having arrow direction as 
the relevant stimulus dimension (upward versus downward pointing) and arrow location 
as the irrelevant stimulus dimension (above versus below fixation). On S-R trials, 
however, the irrelevant dimension was changed from stimulus location to numerosity; 
that is, S-R conflict was generated between the irrelevant stimulus dimension of 
numerosity (represented by how many arrows appeared on the display) and the response 
dimension (which was pressing one key or two keys for an arrow depending on its 
orientation). Subjects experienced conflict on incongruent trials by having to press two 
buttons when presented with one arrow and press one button when presented with two 
arrows. More specifically, on S-R trials, either one or two upward or downward arrows 
appeared. Subjects were instructed to press the ―1‖ key for up arrows and the ―1‖ and ―2‖ 
keys for down arrows. To prevent overlap between the number of arrows and responses 
on S-S trials, all S-S trials presented 4 arrows. Stimuli were blue arrows presented on a 
white background.  
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On mapping trials, a single up or down arrow was presented and subjects 
responded by pressing one key for up arrows (e.g., a key with a ―1‖ label on the 
keyboard) and two keys for a down arrow (e.g., keys with the labels ―1‖ and ―2‖ on 
them). For these two key responses, subjects were instructed to press these keys 
simultaneously. On test trials, all arrows appeared upon the vertical axis, with S-S trials 
appearing towards the top or the bottom of the screen, and S-R trials appearing at center. 
For example, S-S conflict occurred when there were four downward pointing arrows 
above the midline of the screen (down direction conflicted with up location) and S-R 
conflict occurred when two upward arrows appeared at central fixation (one key press 
conflicted with two stimuli presented). The RT used for the two-key responses was the 
average RT for the key pressed first and the key pressed second. Pilot testing revealed 
differences of approximately 15 ms between these key presses. 
Single-Conflict S-S or S-R tasks. Following initial task instructions, all single 
conflict tasks had 10 practice trials which were all congruent where error feedback was 
presented after every trial, 50 response-mapping practice trials (either congruent or 
neutral regarding the irrelevant stimulus dimension) where error and RT feedback was 
presented at the end of the block of trials, and then 10 practice trials with congruency 
manipulated (50% congruent) where error feedback was given after every trial. All 
single-conflict tasks contained 120 trials with 50% congruent trials. The order of trials 
was randomly determined for every subject. The dependent variables for all S-S or S-R 
conflicts tasks were RTs and error rates. 
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Up-Down arrows task (S-S conflict). The stimuli were red arrows presented on a 
green background. The stimuli measured 2° × 8° of visual angle. Each stimulus in the 
task was a set of 4 arrows that all pointed in the same direction. On a given trial, subjects 
were presented with arrows that either pointed up or down. Subjects were instructed to 
press the S or the L key depending on the orientation of the arrow set. The arrows 
appeared approximately 6° of visual angle either above or below the screen center. 
Subjects were given a brief reminder of the instructions and then proceeded to complete 
120 trials where half the trials were congruent. Every trial began with a black fixation 
cross, in 36 point bold Courier New font, for 500 ms. Next a blank screen was presented 
for 100 ms and immediately followed by the target stimulus which was on screen until 
response or 1200 ms. After the target arrows, subjects saw a blank screen for 250 ms 
before the sequence started again. 
Flanker task (S-S conflict). The stimuli in this task were sets of 5 arrows. The 
arrows were black, thin, and had rounded ends. Each stimulus was approximately 6° × 
1.5° of visual angle. These stimuli were presented on a yellow background. The arrows in 
the array either pointed up or down. Subjects were instructed to press a key in response to 
the center arrow in the array. Some subjects were instructed to press the F key for up 
arrows and the J key for down arrows while other subjects were given the opposite 
instructions. The stimulus was always displayed in the center of the screen. On congruent 
trials, all of the arrows pointed in the same direction. On incongruent trials the center 
target arrow pointed in one direction and the 4 flanking arrows (2 on each side) pointed in 
the opposite direction from the target. Every trial began with a fixation cross (18 point 
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Courier New font) for 500 ms, followed by the stimulus which was presented until 
response or 1000 ms whichever came first, and then finished with a blank screen for 250 
ms. 
  Numerosity task (S-R conflict). The stimuli in this task were thin, blue arrows 
with rounded ends. The arrows were presented on a white background. On some trials 
two arrows were presented and on other trials only one arrow was presented. The arrows 
were always presented in the center of the screen. The single arrows measured 
approximately 1.5° × 2° of visual angle and double arrows measured approximately 3° × 
2° of visual angle. These arrows were either pointing up or down. On trials with 2 arrows, 
both arrows pointed in the same direction. Subjects were instructed to push a key labeled 
―1‖ for either up arrows or down arrows and to simultaneously press both the keys 
labeled ―1‖ and ―2‖ for arrows with the other orientation. The RT for trials that required 2 
keys to be pressed was the average RT of the 2 key presses. The order of trials was 
randomly determined. Every trial began with a black fixation cross, in 36 point bold 
Courier New font, for 500 ms. Next, the target stimulus was displayed for 125 ms. After 
target presentation, responses were collected during a blank screen that displayed for 
1250 ms. The sequence began again with the fixation cross began immediately after this 
blank screen. 
Simon task (S-R conflict). Subjects were presented with either circles or squares. 
The shapes were hollow with thick black outlines. Each of the stimuli measured 
approximately 4° × 4° of visual angle. The background screen color was cyan. Subjects 
were instructed to press the X key for a particular shape and the M key for the other 
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shape. Task instructions informed subjects that the target stimulus would appear either on 
the left or right side of the screen (approximately 10° of visual angle from center). The 
order of trials was randomly determined. Every trial began with a black fixation cross, in 
90 point bold Courier New font, for 500 ms. Next, the target stimulus was displayed until 
response or 1200 ms (whichever was shorter). A blank screen for 250 ms followed the 
target presentation. The sequence with the fixation cross began immediately after this 
blank screen. 
Results 
All data from thirty-four subjects who did not meet the processing-accuracy 
criterion for the WMC composite (i.e., ≥ 2 complex span tasks with 85% accuracy on the 
processing task) was dropped. Of these excluded subjects, fifteen only completed the first 
session which had 1 complex span task and therefore they could not meet the criterion. 
This left 241 subjects for analysis. For the conflict tasks, the same outlier screening 
procedure from Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B was used. Subjects whose mapping or 
congruent trial accuracy was 3 times the interquartile range from the mean were dropped 
from the analysis of that specific task. Because adding the response-mapping RT and 
error covariates did not change critical parameter values other than the main effect of 
WMC on the dependent variable, models without the covariates were reported 
1
. 
WMC screening. WMC measurement task scores correlated with rs ranging from 
.25 to .44 and had reliability estimates ranging from .70 to .85 (see Table 5). In this 
experiment, I created Z scores for each task using the means and standard deviations 
from Experiment 3 subjects rather than the Kane lab subject database (as done in the 
67 
 
previous experiments) because I did not have corresponding means and SDs for this 
version of RSPAN and for the updating task (see Table 6 for descriptive statistics for 
working memory measures from this experiment). Therefore, I did not compare the 
WMC composite from Experiment 3 to those from the earlier experiments. 
Dual-Conflict Tasks.  
Joystick replication task. The outlier screening procedure identified nine subjects 
whose data were dropped from this task leaving data from 232 subjects for analysis (for 
all dual-conflict tasks see Table 7 for descriptive statistics). Higher-WMC subjects were 
faster than lower WMC subjects on response-mapping trials (b = -22 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = 
-2.3). Higher-WMC subjects were faster during the first half of the response-mapping 
trials (b = -24 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -2.5), the second half (b = -21 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -
2.0), and nearly statistically faster for the last 25 trials (b = -19 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -1.9). 
WMC also predicted errors on mapping trials, with higher-WMC subjects less likely to 
make an error, overall (b = -0.33, SE = 0.09, Z = -3.5), during the first half of the 
mapping trials (b = -0.37, SE = 0.10, Z = -3.7), the second half of mapping trials (b = -
0.31, SE = 0.11, Z = -2.8), and the last 25 trials (b = -0.31, SE = 0.12, Z = -2.6). 
S-S RTs. Subjects were slower on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (b = 
29 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 14.6). The S-S interference parameter estimate was smaller than 
the estimates from Experiment 1 (38 ms) and 2A (35 ms). WMC did not predict RTs 
overall (b = -13 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -1.3). Here, unlike Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B (with 
key-press responding), WMC missed the significance criterion for predicting S-S 
interference (b = -5 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -1.8; see Figure 12a).  
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S-S errors. Subjects experienced error interference on S-S trials (b = 0.38, SE = 
0.04, Z = 8.8). WMC did not predict overall errors (b = -0.12, SE = 0.08, Z = -1.4), nor 
error interference (b = 0.01, SE = 0.06, Z = 0.2; see Figure 12b).  
S-R RTs. Subjects experienced substantial interference on S-R trials (b = 57 ms, 
SE = 2 ms, t = 29.7). This parameter estimate was larger than the S-R interference 
parameter from Experiments 1 (45 ms) and 2A (43 ms). WMC did not predict RTs on S-
R trials (b = -12 ms, SE = 9 ms, t = -1.3) or S-R interference (b = -1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -
0.3). 
S-R errors. Error rates were higher on incongruent trials than on congruent trials 
(b = 1.8, SE = 0.05, Z = 38.5). WMC did not predict errors overall (b = -0.11, SE = 0.09, 
Z = -1.3), but higher-WMC subjects experienced less error interference than did lower-
WMC subjects (b = -0.17, SE = 0.06, Z = -2.7), in contrast to the findings from 
Experiments 1 and 2A. Higher and lower-WMC subjects did not differ in the amount of 
errors committed on congruent trials (b = -0.01, SE = 0.10, Z = -0.6), but higher-WMC 
subjects committed fewer errors on incongruent trials (b = -0.20, SE = 0.09, Z = -2.2). 
Comparison of S-S to S-R trials in RTs. For these analyses, conflict type was 
dummy-coded. S-R trials were the reference level and S-S trials were the comparison 
level. S-S trials were slower than S-R trials (b = 22 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 15.9). There was 
less interference on S-S trials than on S-R trials (b = -29 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -10.5). The 
relation between WMC and S-S interference was not significantly different from the 
relation between WMC and S-R interference (b = -4 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -1.1). 
69 
 
Comparison of S-S to S-R trials in errors. Subjects were less likely to make an 
error on a S-S trial than on a S-R trial (b = -0.14, SE = 0.03, Z = -4.5) and S-S trials 
produced less interference than did S-R trials (b = -1.43, SE = 0.06, Z = -22.5). Higher-
WMC subjects did not differ from lower-WMC subjects in the amount of error 
interference exhibited on S-S trials, but did show an advantage over lower-WMC subjects 
on S-R trials, resulting in a significant three-way interaction between trial type, WMC, 
and congruency (b = 0.19, SE = 0.09, Z = 2.2). 
Delta plots. In addition to the visual evidence provided by the delta plots of the 1
st
 
and 3
rd
 terciles of the WMC distribution, LMMs were conducted with subjects as random 
effects and WMC and bins as fixed effects with the difference between the aggregated 
incongruent trials and congruent trials as the dependent variable.  
S-S trial delta plot. Although the delta plot (see Figure 13) seemed to suggest that 
higher-WMC subjects experienced less RT interference than did lower-WMC subjects, 
especially for the slowest trials, this visual impression was not confirmed by the LMM. 
Neither WMC (b = 0 ms, SE =6 ms, t =0.0), bins (b = -2 ms, SE =1 ms, t = -1.9), nor 
their interaction reached the significance criterion (b = -2 ms, SE =2 ms, t = -1.1). 
S-R trial delta plot. As depicted in Figure 14, the delta plot revealed mostly 
overlapping lines between WMC tercile groups with interference slightly ascending as 
RTs slowed. The LMM was consistent with this impression. The only predictor reaching 
statistical significance was bin (b = 4 ms, SE =1 ms, t = 3.1). Neither WMC (b = -8 ms, 
SE = 6 ms, t = -1.2), nor the interaction between WMC and bin reached the significance 
criterion (b = 2 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 1.4). 
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Congruency-Sequence effects. I used a LMM with subjects as a random effect and 
current trial congruency, previous trial congruency, WMC, trial type, and trial-type 
repetition as fixed effects. Only correct trials preceded by correct trials were used in this 
analysis. 
Congruency-Sequence effects in RTs. On trials where the conflict type did not 
repeat from the previous trial, previous-trial congruency did not affect the congruency 
effect on the current trial (b = 0 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.1), but on trials where the conflict 
type repeated there was a large effect of the previous trial’s congruency on the current-
trial congruency effect (b = -69 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -12.9). WMC did not moderate 
congruency-sequence effects when the conflict type switched from trial-to-trial (b = 1 ms, 
SE = 5 ms, t = 0.3) or when the conflict type repeated (b = 9 ms, SE =7 ms, t = 1.2). 
When S-S trials were selected and examined separately, congruency-sequence effects 
were significant (b = -59 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -10.9) and not moderated by WMC (b = 6 
ms, SE = 8 ms, t = 0.8). On S-R trials, large congruency-sequence effects were found (b 
= -79 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = 14.8), but WMC did not significantly moderate the effect on S-
R trials, either (b = 13 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = 1.8).   
Congruency-Sequence effects in errors. Congruency-sequence effects were not 
found on conflict-switch trials (b = 0.1, SE = 0.09, Z = 1.5), but were found on conflict-
repeat trials (b = -2.0, SE = 0.14, Z = -14.8). WMC did not moderate congruency-
sequence effects on conflict-switch (b = -0.3, SE = 0.13, Z = -0.2) or conflict-repeat trials 
(b = -0.03, SE = 0.18, Z = -0.1). The conflict-specific analyses found congruency-
sequence effects for both S-S (b = -1.33, SE = 0.14, Z = -9.7) and S-R trials (b = -2.27, 
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SE = 0.15, Z = -14.8), WMC did not moderate either of these effects (S-S trials:  b = -0.2, 
SE = 0.2, Z = 1.0; S-R trials:  b = -0.01, SE = 0.21, Z = 0.0).    
Axis-shifted joystick task. Data from 234 subjects were analyzed (data from seven 
subjects were dropped from the outlier screening). Variation in WMC did not predict 
mapping RT overall (b = - 9 ms, SE = 9 ms, t = -1.0), for the first 50 trials (b = - 11 ms, 
SE = 10 ms, t = -1.1), for the second 50 trials (b = - 8 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -0.8), or the 
last 25 trials (b = - 10 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -1.1). WMC did predict mapping errors overall 
(b = -0.26, SE = 0.10, Z = -2.7), for the first 50 mapping trials (b = -0.29 SE = 0.10, Z = -
2.9), the second 50 trials (b = -0.23, SE = 0.11, Z = -2.1), and the last 25 trials (b = -0.24, 
SE = 0.12, Z = -2.0) with higher-WMC subjects less likely to commit an error than 
lower-WMC subjects. 
S-S RTs. Subjects were slower on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (b = 
23 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 9.4). Variation in WMC did not significantly predict overall RT (b 
= -18 ms, SE = 10 ms, t = -1.8), or RT interference (b = 3 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 1.0).  
S- S errors. Subjects committed more errors on incongruent than on congruent 
trials (b = 0.15, SE = 0.03, Z = 4.9). Overall, higher-WMC subjects committed fewer 
errors (b = -0.24, SE = 0.09, Z = -2.8), but showed more error interference (b = 0.08, SE 
= 0.04, Z = 2.1). This was the result of higher-WMC subjects having a greater advantage 
over lower-WMC subjects on congruent trials (b = -0.29, SE = 0.09, Z = -3.2) than on 
incongruent trials (b = -0.19, SE = 0.09, Z = -2.2), but higher-WMC subjects were less 
likely to commit errors on both congruent and incongruent trials. 
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S-R RTs. Incongruent trials were slower than congruent trials (b = 45 ms, SE = 2 
ms, t = 20.5). Variation in WMC did not predict overall RT (b = -12 ms, SE = 9 ms, t = -
1.3) or RT interference (b = 2 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.6). 
S- R errors. More errors were committed on incongruent trials than on congruent 
trials (b = 0.49, SE = 0.03, Z = 17.3). Overall, higher-WMC subjects made fewer errors 
than lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.25, SE = 0.08, Z = -3.1), and again —like in the S-S 
trials in this task— experienced more error interference than lower-WMC subjects (b = 
0.08, SE = 0.04, Z = 2.2). Also, like the results from the S-S trials, higher-WMC subjects 
were less likely to make errors on both congruent trials (b = -0.25, SE = 0.11, Z = -2.2) 
and incongruent trials (b = -0.22, SE = 0.9, Z = -2.4). 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials in RTs. Subjects were slower on S-S trials than 
on S-R trials (b = 15 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 9.1) and experienced less interference on S-S 
trials than on S-R trials (b = -22 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -6.6). As evident in Figure 15a, 
WMC did not differentially relate to S-S compared to S-R RT interference (b = 2 ms, SE 
= 5 ms, t = 0.4). 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials in errors. Subjects were less likely to commit 
errors on S-S trials compared to S-R trials (b = -0.21, SE = 0.02, Z = -10.1) and 
experienced less interference on S-S trials (b = -0.35, SE = 0.04, Z = -8.4). The difference 
in error interference between S-S trials and S-R trials was not moderated by WMC (b = 
0.00, SE = 0.05, Z = 0.0; see Figure 15b). 
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Delta plots. 
S-S trial delta plot. As shown in Figure 16, there was an overall descending 
pattern of interference as RTs got longer. For most of the bins, the WMC tercile groups 
overlapped, but the higher-WMC subjects leveled off from the 4
th
 bin to the 5
th
 bin while 
the lower-WMC subjects continued to exhibit a descending pattern. The LMM was 
mostly consistent with the visual observation. Variation in WMC did not predict 
difference scores overall (b = -7 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -1.1). Interference did decrease 
significantly over bins (b = -6 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -4.8), but the interaction between WMC 
and bins was not significant (b = 3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 1.9). I conducted a t-test between 
the upper and lower terciles of the WMC distribution on the slowest (5
th
) bin. This t-test 
produced a non-significant result (t = 1.1) suggesting a lot of within- tercile variance. 
S-R trial delta plot. The delta plot on S-R trials (see Figure 17) revealed an 
upward trajectory, with interference increasing as RTs slowed, consistent with patterns 
observed in prior investigations of vertically-oriented S-R tasks (Proctor et al., 2011). 
Like the S-S delta plot from this task, the tercile groups overlapped until the slowest bin. 
The LMM was mostly consistent with this observation. Interference did increase with 
slower RTs (b = 11 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 4.8). WMC did not predict interference (b = 4 ms, 
SE = 12 ms, t = 0.3), nor was there an interaction between WMC and bin in predicting 
interference (b = 0 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.1). 
Congruency-Sequence effects. 
Congruency-Sequence effects in RTs. Congruency-sequence effects were not 
detected on conflict-switch trials (b = -3 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.6), but substantial and 
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significant congruency-sequence effects were found on conflict-repeat trials (b = -59 ms, 
SE = 7 ms, t = -8.7). WMC did not interact with either conflict-switch congruency-
sequence effects (b = 0 ms, SE = 7 ms, t = 0.6) or conflict-repeat congruency-sequence 
effects (b = -3 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.6). When examining only S-S trials that were 
preceded by S-S trials, congruency-sequence effects were detected (b = -61 ms, SE = 8 
ms, t = -7.8), but were not moderated by WMC (b = 0 ms, SE = 11 ms, t = 0.0). S-R 
repetition trials produced the same pattern, with significant congruency-sequence effects 
(b = -64 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -9.9) and no interaction with WMC (b = 4 ms, SE = 9 ms, t = 
0.5).  
Congruency-Sequence effects in errors. Significant congruency-sequence effects 
were not found on conflict-switch trials (b = 0.07, SE = 0.1, Z = 1.0), but were found on 
conflict-repeat trials (b = -0.85, SE = 0.1, Z = -8.91). WMC did not moderate this effect 
on conflict-switch trials (b = 0.14, SE = 0.1, Z = 1.6), or on conflict-repeat trials (b = 
0.07, SE = 0.1, Z = 1.0). On S-S repetition trials, significant congruency-sequence effects 
were found (b = -0.53, SE = 0.1, Z = -5.3), which did not interact with WMC (b = -0.22, 
SE = 0.13, Z = -1.7). The model on S-R repetition trials revealed the same pattern with 
significant congruency-sequence effects (b = -1.05, SE = 0.1, Z = -10.8) that were no 
different for subjects with different WMC scores (b = 0.01, SE = 0.1, Z = 0.1). 
Up-Down numerosity. After exclusion criteria were applied, data from 227 
subjects remained for analysis (i.e., data from fourteen subjects were dropped). Because I 
aggregated subjects’ response times on trials which required two buttons to be pressed, I 
investigated if the ability to simultaneously press 2 buttons was related to WMC by 
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including a factor in the model that indicated if it was a trial with 1 or 2 keys that needed 
to be pressed. I removed 8 additional subjects whose RT difference between the 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 key presses on the mapping trials was greater than three times the interquartile range 
beyond the mean leaving data from 219 subjects to analyze. For these 219 subjects, key 
presses differed by an average of 15 ms (SD = 12 ms) on test trials where 2 key presses 
were required. 
 On response-mapping trials, overall, WMC was not related to RT (b = -3 ms, SE 
= 5 ms, t = -0.6). Trials that required 2 key presses were slower than trials that required 
one (b = 23 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 20.0), and WMC moderated RT depending on the 
response type. Higher-WMC subjects slowed down more than did lower-WMC on trials 
that required 2 keys to be pressed (b = 3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 2.1). On the first 50 mapping 
trials, WMC did not predict RTs (b = -4 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -0.9), trials that required 2 
keys were slower than trials that required 1 (b = -24 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 14.8), but the 
interaction between WMC and response type was not significant (b = 2 ms, SE = 2 ms, t 
= 0.9). For the second 50 mapping trials, WMC did not predict RTs (b = -1 ms, SE = 5 
ms, t = -0.2), two key responses were slower than 1 key responses (b = 22 ms, SE = 2 ms, 
t = 13.0), and the interaction between WMC and response type was significant (b = 5ms, 
SE = 2ms, t = 2.5). On the last 25 trials, WMC did not predict mapping RTs (b = -2 ms, 
SE = 6 ms, t = -0.3), two key response were slower than 1 key responses (b = 25 ms, SE 
= 2 ms, t = 10.7), but the interaction between WMC and response type was not 
significant (b = 1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.3).  
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WMC did not predict errors overall (b = -0.22, SE = 0.13, Z = -1.7), for the first 
50 trials (b = -0.09, SE = 0.09, Z = -1.0), the last 50 trials (b = -0.17, SE = 0.09, Z = -1.8), 
or the last 25 trials (b = -0.10, SE = 0.12, Z = -0.9). Subjects were not more likely to 
make errors on trials where 2 keys had to be pressed compared to the one key trials 
overall (b = -0.05, SE = 0.12, Z = -0.4), in the first 50 trials (b = -0.09, SE = 0.09, Z = -
1.0), the second 50 trials (b = -0.17, SE = 0.09, Z = -1.8), or in the last 25 trials (b = -
0.10, SE = 0.12, Z = -0.9). 
S-S RTs. On the test trials, subjects showed congruency effects on S-S trials with 
incongruent trials being slower than congruent trials (b = 22 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 20.0). 
WMC did not predict overall RT (b = -9 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -1.5), nor did WMC did 
predict the size of the congruency effect (b = -3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -1.9). In the test trials, 
responses that required 2 key presses were faster than trials where 1 key was pressed (b = 
-3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -2.4). Response type (i.e., 1 key press vs. 2 key press responses) 
did not interact with the congruency effect (b = 1 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 0.6) or WMC (b = 2 
ms, SE = 2 ms, t = 1.0). 
 S-S errors. Subjects committed more errors on incongruent SS trials than on 
congruent trials (b = 0.35, SE = 0.04, Z = 9.1). Overall, variation in WMC did not predict 
errors (b = -0.13, SE = 0.07, Z = -1.7). However, higher-WMC subjects did commit 
significantly fewer errors than lower-WMC subjects on 1-key response trials (b = -0.24, 
SE = 0.10, Z = -2.5) and this relation was significantly different from the relation 
between WMC and errors on 2-key response trials, where there was no WMC-related 
difference (b = -0.02, SE = 0.10, Z = -0.2). Errors were less frequent on 2-key responses 
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than on 1-key responses (b = -0.09, SE = 0.04, Z = -2.3). The congruency effect was 
larger on 1-key trials than on 2-key trials (b = -0.34, SE = 0.08, Z = -4.4). There were no 
WMC-related differences in the congruency effect (b = -0.01, SE = 0.05, Z = -0.1). 
S-R RTs. On S-R trials, subjects experienced interference due to the congruency 
manipulation (b = 40 ms, SE =1 ms, t = 37.2). WMC did not significantly predict overall 
RT (-11 ms, SE =6 ms, t = -1.7) or the magnitude of S-R interference (-2 ms, SE =2 ms, t 
= -1.4). Responses that required 2 response keys were slower than trials that only 
required 1 response key (b = 43 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 39.8) and higher-WMC subjects 
experienced less slowing than did lower-WMCs subjects going from 1 response key to 2 
response keys (b = -3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -2.2). Subjects experienced more interference 
on trials that required 2 response keys than on trials that required 1 (b = 17 ms, SE = 2 
ms, t = 7.6). Response type did not affect the WMC × interference relation (b = 2 ms, SE 
= 3 ms, t = 0.8).  
 S-R errors. Subjects made more errors on incongruent trials than on congruent 
trials (b = 1.16, SE = 0.05, Z = 25.5). WMC did not predict errors overall (b = -0.13, SE 
= 0.08, Z = -1.6), nor did WMC predict error interference (b = -0.01, SE = 0.06, Z = -
0.2). Overall, response type did not predict errors (b = -0.02, SE = 0.11, Z = -0.2), but 
there was an interaction between response type and interference, with larger error 
interference on trials that required 2 buttons to be pressed (b = 0.20, SE = 0.09, Z = 2.2). 
WMC did not moderate the effects of response type on error rates (b = 0.06, SE = 0.16, Z 
= 0.4). The three-way interaction between WMC, interference, and response type was 
also not significant (b = 0.06, SE = 0.13, Z = -0.5).  
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Comparison of S-S and S-R trials in RTs. S-S trials yielded slower responses than 
did S-R trials (b = 17 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 22.1) and subjects exhibited less S-S than S-R 
interference (b = -19 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -11.9). As depicted in Figure 18a, WMC did not 
differentially relate to one type of conflict over the other (b = -1 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -0.8). 
Comparison of S-S and S-R trials in errors. Subjects were more likely to make 
errors on S-S trials than on S-R trials (b = 0.17, SE = 0.03, Z = 5.6). Subjects showed 
significantly less S-S than S-R interference (b = -0.80, SE = 0.06, Z = -13.3). WMC did 
not differ in how it predicted S-S or S-R interference (b = -0.03, SE = 0.08, Z = -.40; see 
Figure 18b). 
S-S trial delta plot. Consistent with the RT analysis, the delta plot for S-S trials 
(see Figure 19) showed no separation between the upper and lower terciles of the WMC. 
S-S interference showed a similar pattern over bins as was seen in the dual-conflict tasks 
in Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B, with a subtle rise in interference over the first 2 bins and 
then a subtle drop over the last 3 bins. The LMM on this delta plot was consistent with 
the visual impression. WMC did not predict interference (b = 0 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.0). 
Overall, interference reduced across bins (b = -3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -5.5), and the 
interaction between WMC and bins was non-significant (b = -1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -1.5). 
S-R trial delta plot. The delta plot on S-R trials revealed an ascending pattern of 
interference with little separation between WMC tercile groups (see Figure 20). The 
LMM was in accord with the visual observation. Interference increased over bins (b = 13 
ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 26.8). WMC did not predict interference (b = 1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 
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0.4), and there was no interaction between WMC and bins (b = -1 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -
1.6). 
Congruency-Sequence effects in RTs. On trials where the conflict type switched 
from the previous trial no congruency-sequence effects were detected (b = 3 ms, SE = 2 
ms, t = 1.5) whereas on trials where the conflict type repeated, they were (b = -48 ms, SE 
= 3 ms, t = -15.1). WMC did not relate to congruency-sequence effects on trials where 
the trial type repeated (b = 2 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.5), or on trials where it did not (b = -1 
ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.2). On trials where the S-S conflict type repeated significant 
congruency-sequence effects were found (b = -55 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -17.12) such that 
there was a reverse congruency effect on these trials with congruent trials being slower 
than incongruent trials (i.e., RT interference on S-S trials was 22 ms). Here, WMC did 
moderate the magnitude of the congruency-sequence effects (b = 9 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = 
2.0). On S-R conflict-repeat trials congruency-sequence effects were found (b = -33 ms, 
SE = 3 ms, t = -10.7). These were not significantly moderated by WMC (b = -7 ms, SE = 
4 ms, t = -1.5).  
 Congruency-Sequence effects in errors. On trials where the conflict did not 
repeat from the previous trial, congruency-sequence effects were not detected (b = 0.16, 
SE = 0.09, Z = 1.8). When the conflict type repeated, significant and substantial 
congruency-sequence effects were found (b = -1.28, SE = 0.13, Z = -9.9). WMC did not 
predict the size of congruency-sequence effects when the trial types repeated (b = -0.19, 
SE = 0.18, Z = -1.1) or did not repeat (b = 0.21, SE = 0.12, Z = 1.7). 
 
80 
 
Dual-Conflict Task Discussion 
The pattern of results from the joystick replication task did not replicate the 
results from Experiment 2A (or Experiment 1) where higher-WMC subjects exhibited a 
significant RT advantage on S-S trials and a significant error disadvantage on S-R trials. 
Here, the WMC × SS interference parameter was comparable to the parameters from 
Experiments 1 and 2A (-5 ms vs. Experiment 2A [-4ms], Experiment 1 [-7ms]), but did 
not quite meet the significance criterion. However, the relation between WMC and errors 
on the S-R trials flipped in the joystick replication task from Experiments 1 and 2A. In 
the joystick replication task, higher-WMC subjects experienced less error interference 
than did lower-WMC subjects. As is the case when a replication experiment is not an 
exact replication, it is hard to know how the replication finding relates to the tasks used in 
Experiment 1 and Experiment 2A. Either the mode of responding changed the 
relationship between WMC and interference (specifically S-R interference) or this task 
provides evidence that the previously found relation between WMC and S-R error 
interference is not robust or reliable. 
The axis-shifted task removed the confound between axis and conflict type. In 
this task, variation in WMC did not predict RTs, but did predict errors. Here, higher-
WMC subjects experienced more S-S and S-R error interference than lower-WMC 
subjects (again not replicating the results from the earlier experiments). If in this task, we 
had found that higher-WMC subjects now experienced less S-R RT interference and 
more S-S error interference, the dissociation between S-S and S-R interference would 
have been shown to be a difference in resolving conflict on horizontal versus vertical 
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axes. Or, if the pattern of results from Experiments 1 and 2A (higher-WMC subjects with 
less S-S RT interference and greater S-R error interference) were repeated here, then we 
would have had strong evidence for the WMC-related differences in S-S and S-R conflict 
resolution. The results from this experiment fit neither of these scenarios. Instead, it 
appears that there may be an interaction between WMC, conflict type, and axis. Or, 
perhaps because this task occurred deep in the second session and followed multiple tasks 
that displayed up-down arrows that required left-right responses, this result was 
influenced by the carryover of task sets with higher-WMC subjects having learned the 
earlier stimulus-response pairings better than lower-WMC subjects and therefore had 
more interference to overcome. This speculation is not supported, however, by the 
response-mapping data, in which higher-WMC subjects were less likely to make an error 
across all of the practice. 
To test whether the WMC dissociations between S-S and S-R interference found 
in Experiments 1 and 2A were dependent on stimulus location being the irrelevant 
interference dimension, subjects completed the Up-Down Numerosity task. S-R 
interference was generated by an overlap between the irrelevant stimulus dimension, of 
how many stimuli were presented, and the response dimension of how many response 
keys needed to be pressed. Unlike Experiments 1 and 2A (and like the joystick 
replication and axis-shifted tasks), higher-WMC subjects were not more likely than 
lower-WMC subjects to commit errors on the S-R trials. In addition, variation in WMC 
did not predict overall S-R RT, S-S RT, or S-S error interference. Because of the 
differences in the overall pattern of results from Experiments 1 and 2A, the results from 
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this task do not clearly speak to the hypothesis being tested (i.e., is there something 
special about the relation between WMC and irrelevant location information?), but speak 
more broadly to the robustness of  these effects. Three not necessarily mutually exclusive 
explanations may be responsible for the frailty of these effects: (1) WMC-conflict 
resolutions relations are variable and not easy to detect consistently (suggesting the 
possibility of Type 1 errors in the earlier experiments); (2) the WMC-related effects are 
dependent on the specific task context of Experiments 1 and 2A, or; (3) these effects are 
reactive to previously completed tasks and are not suitable for experimental protocols like 
the one used here.   
Single-Conflict tasks. 
Up-Down arrows. Twelve outlying subjects were dropped, leaving data from 229 
subjects to analyze. See Table 8 for the descriptive statistics for all single-conflict tasks. 
Higher-WMC subjects were faster than lower-WMC subjects on the mapping trials 
overall (b = -16 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -3.3), on the first 25 trials (b = -16 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = 
-3.1), and on the last 25 trials (b = -15 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -2.9).WMC did not predict 
accuracy in the mapping trials overall (b = 0.01, SE = 0.09, Z = 0.1), on the first 25 trials 
(b = 0.00, SE = 0.11, Z = 0.0), or on the last 25 trials (b = 0.03, SE = 0.11, Z = 0.3). 
RTs. On the test trials, subjects were slower to respond when the position and the 
direction of the arrows were incongruent (b = 19 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 14.8). This S-S 
interference was not significantly moderated by subjects’ WMC (b = -3 ms, SE = 2 ms, t 
= -1.5), nor was WMC a significant predictor of overall RT (b = -5 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -
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1.3). Figure 21 displays the WMC × interference parameter values for all the single-
conflict tasks that presented S-S conflict. 
Errors. Subjects committed more errors on incongruent than congruent trials (b = 
0.49, SE = 0.05, Z = 9.0). Overall, WMC did not predict errors (b = -0.13, SE = 0.07, Z = 
-1.7). Higher-WMC subjects experienced less S-S error interference than did lower-
WMC subjects (b = -0.15, SE = 0.07, Z = -2.1).This interaction was produced because 
higher and lower-WMC subjects did not differ on congruent trials (b = -0.03, SE = 0.09, 
Z = -0.4), but higher-WMC subjects were less likely to commit an error on incongruent 
trials (b = -0.20, SE = 0.08, Z = -2.5). 
Delta plot. Although the delta plot depicts separation between higher and lower-
WMC subjects at all bins (see Figure 22), in the individual difference analysis there was 
no main effect  of WMC (b = -1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -0.3) or interaction between WMC 
and bin (b = 0 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -0.4). Only a significant effect of bin was observed 
with interference decreasing as RTs slowed (b = -3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -6.2).   
  Congruency-Sequence effects. Large RT congruency-sequence effects were found 
(b = -93 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -37.4) indicating a crossover interaction (i.e., the interaction 
parameter estimate of -93 ms is larger than the effect of congruency 19 ms). This 
interaction was further moderated by WMC (b = 7 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 2.0) with higher-
WMC subjects experiencing less of an adjustment after incongruent trials than did lower-
WMC subjects. Subjects experienced less error interference after an incongruent trial 
than after a congruent trial (b = -3.35, SE = 0.15, Z = -22.0). WMC did not affect the 
magnitude of this effect (b = -0.24, SE = 0.20, Z = -1.2). 
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Flanker. Data from 235 subjects were left for analysis after six outliers were 
excluded. In addition to applying the mapping and congruent accuracy criteria, one 
additional subject who had a 95% error rate on incongruent trials was also removed. On 
the mapping trials, higher-WMC subjects were faster than lower-WMC subjects overall 
(b = -12 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -3.6), on the first 25 trials (b = -10 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -2.7), 
and on the last 25 trials (b = -14 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -3.9). No WMC-related differences 
were found on errors in the mapping trials overall (b = -0.12, SE = 0.09, Z = -1.3), on the 
first 25 trials (b = -0.19, SE = 0.10, Z = -1.8), or on the last 25 trials (b = -0.01, SE = 
0.11, Z = -0.1). 
 RTs. Subjects were slower on incongruent trials than on congruent trials (b = 47 
ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 48.3). WMC did not predict overall RT (b = -5 ms, SE = 2.9 ms, t = -
1.7), nor did variation in WMC predict the amount of S-S interference experienced (b = 1 
ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 1.0). 
 Errors. Subjects made more errors on incongruent trials than on congruent trials 
(b = 1.3, SE = 0.06, Z = 21.4). Overall, higher-WMC subjects committed fewer errors 
than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.2, SE = 0.06, Z = 21.4), but higher-WMC subjects 
experienced greater S-S interference in errors than did lower WMC subjects (b = 0.2, SE 
= 0.08, Z = 3.0): Higher-WMC subjects committed significantly fewer errors on 
congruent trials than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.4, SE = 0.11, Z = 3.0), but did not 
differ from lower-WMC subjects in the amount of errors committed on incongruent trials 
(b = -0.1, SE = 0.08, Z = -1.0). 
85 
 
Delta plot. The delta plot in Figure 23 reveals a curvilinear relationship between 
bins and interference. Higher-WMC subjects experienced less interference on the fastest 
trials than lower-WMC subjects and more interference on the slowest trials than lower-
WMC subjects. Higher-WMC subjects’ shorter RTs were reflected in their distribution 
being shifted to the left to the lower-WMC subject’s distribution.   
In the LMM on the aggregated interference effects, higher-WMC subjects showed 
less interference overall (b = -9 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -3.0). In general, interference 
increased as bins increased (b = 2 ms, SE = 0 ms, t = 3.7), and there was an interaction 
between WMC and bins (b = 3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 5.0) with higher-WMC subjects 
interference effects growing faster than lower-WMC subjects over progressing bins. 
Congruency-Sequence effects. Subjects experienced less RT interference after an 
incongruent than congruent trial (b = -22 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -11.0). WMC did not 
moderate  this congruency-sequence effect (b = 0 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.1). Congruency-
sequence effects were found in errors, as well (b = -0.5, SE = 0.13, Z = -3.6). WMC 
variation did not affect the magnitude of the error congruency-sequence effects (b = -0.1, 
SE = 0.18, Z = -0.4).   
Simon. After excluding 12 outliers, I analyzed data from 229 subjects. Higher-
WMC subjects were faster than lower-WMC subjects on mapping trials overall (b = -11 
ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -2.5), and on the first 25 trials (b = -13 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -3.0), but 
not on the last 25 trials (b = -9 ms, SE = 5 ms, t = -1.7). On the mapping trials, WMC did 
not meet the significance criterion for predicting errors overall (b = -0.18, SE = 0.09, Z = 
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-1.9) or on the last 25 trials (b = -0.12, SE = 0.11, Z = -1.1), but WMC did predict errors 
on the first 25 trials (b = -0.26, SE = 0.12, Z = -2.1). 
RTs. On the test trials, subjects experienced S-R interference from the congruency 
manipulation (b = 24 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 18.7), higher-WMC subjects were overall faster 
(b = -9 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -2.1), but WMC did not significantly affect the magnitude of 
S-R interference (b = -2 ms, SE = 2 ms, t = -1.4). The WMC × interference parameters 
for all the single-conflict S-R tasks are displayed in Figure 24. 
Errors. On the test trials overall, subjects made more errors on incongruent trials 
then on congruent trials (b = 0.63, SE = 0.05, Z = 12.1). Higher-WMC subjects 
committed fewer errors than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.14, SE = 0.07, Z = -2.0). 
WMC did not predict the amount of S-R interference (b = -0.06, SE = 0.07, Z = -0.08).   
Delta plot. As depicted in Figure 25, the delta plot for the Simon task revealed its 
characteristic negative slope (Pratte et al., 2010). The WMC terciles seemed had some 
separation only at the 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 bin, with higher-WMC subjects showing less 
interference the lower-WMC subjects. In the individual-difference analyses, WMC did 
not predict interference (b = -3 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -0.6), but confirming the appearance 
of a downward slope, bins did (b = -3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -4.9). The WMC × bin 
interaction was not significant (b = 0 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -0.2). 
Congruency-Sequence effects. In the model with trials only preceded by correct 
trials and the addition of previous trial congruency as a predictor, a large RT congruency-
sequence effect was found (b = -93 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -36.8). This effect was not 
moderated by WMC (b = 2 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.6). In errors, congruency-sequence 
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effects were found (b = -3.4, SE = 0.15, Z = -23.0). Higher-WMC subjects showed 
greater error congruency-sequence effects than lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.4, SE = 
0.19, Z = -2.2).  
Numerosity. After excluding subjects for mapping and congruent trial error rates, 
234 subjects remained. Five additional subjects were removed whose RT difference 
between the 1
st
 and 2
nd
 key presses on mapping trials was greater than three times the 
interquartile range beyond the mean. This left data from 229 subjects in the analysis.   
On mapping trials, WMC was not related to RT, overall (b = -8 ms, SE = 6 ms, t 
= -1.2), on the first 25 trials (b = -6 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -1.0), or the last 25 trials (b = -10 
ms, SE = 7 ms, t = -1.4). Trials that required 2 key presses were slower than trials that 
required one, overall (b = 15 ms, SE = 2ms, t = 8.1), for the first 25 trials (b = 15 ms, SE 
= 3 ms, t = 5.6), and the last 25 trials (b = 15 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 5.8). WMC did not 
interact with the difference between the response types, overall (b = -1 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 
-0.4), on the first 25 trials (b = -1 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = -0.3), or on the last 25 trials (b = -0 
ms, SE = 3 ms, t = 0.0).  
Higher-WMC subjects were less likely to commit errors on mapping trials, overall 
(b = -0.22, SE = 0.08, Z = -2.7) and on the first 25 trials (b = -0.24, SE = 0.10, Z = -2.3), 
but not on the last 25 trials (b = -0.18, SE = 0.10, Z = -1.8). WMC did not interact with 
response type in the prediction of errors overall (b = -0.21, SE = 0.11, Z = -1.9), or on the 
first 25 trials (b = -0.09, SE = 0.15, Z = -0.5) of mapping. But, on the last 25 trials of 
mapping, WMC interacted with response type, with higher-WMC subject less likely than 
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lower-WMC subjects to make an error on a trial requiring a two key response (b = -0.36, 
SE = 0.17, Z = -2.1). 
RTs. On the test trials, subjects were slower on incongruent trials than on 
congruent trials (b = 58 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 43.9). Higher-WMC subjects were faster 
across all trials (b = -16 ms, SE = 6 ms, t = -2.6) and, as can be seen in Figure 24a, 
experienced less S-R interference than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -6 ms, SE = 2 ms, t 
= -3.4). Trials that required 2 keys to be pressed were again slower than trials where 1 
key was pressed (b = 19 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 14.3), but response type did not significantly 
interact with the any other predictor variables. 
Errors. Subjects made more errors on incongruent trials than on congruent trials 
(b = 1.89, SE = 0.09, Z = 20.9). Overall, higher-WMC subjects committed fewer errors 
than did lower-WMC subjects (b = -0.24, SE = 0.08, Z = -3.1), but WMC did not 
significantly predict S-R interference (b = 0.19, SE = 0.11, Z = 1.7). No other main 
effects or interactions were present in the model. 
Delta plot. Figure 26 shows overlapping lines for the WMC tercile groups until 
the 5
th
 bin, where the lower-WMC subjects appeared to be slower and to exhibit more 
interference. In the LMM with WMC and RT bins as predictors, there was no main effect 
of WMC (b = 3 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.7). Bins predicted interference with interference 
increasing as RTs slowed (b = 21 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = 32.3). Confirming the observation 
from the delta plot, WMC and bin interacted (-3 ms, SE = 1 ms, t = -3.4) with higher-
WMC subjects showing less S-R interference than did lower-WMC subjects at longer 
RTs.  
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Congruency-Sequence effects. In RTs, significant congruency-sequence effects 
were detected (b = -27 ms, SE = 3 ms, t = -10.0). RT congruency-sequence effects were 
not moderated by WMC (b = 1 ms, SE = 4 ms, t = 0.3). Significant congruency-sequence 
effects were also detected in errors (b = -0.84, SE = 0.18, Z = -4.8). WMC did not 
moderate the error congruency-sequence effects (b = 0.01, SE = 0.23, Z = 0.0). 
Single-Conflict Task Discussion 
A clear pattern of WMC and conflict-type relations did not emerge from the 
single-conflict tasks. Higher-WMC subjects showed their largest RT interference 
advantage over lower-WMC subjects in the S-R conflict numerosity task and an error 
interference disadvantage compared to lower-WMC subjects in the S-S conflict flanker 
task. In the Simon task, WMC variation did not predict error or RT interference, while in 
the up-down arrows task, higher-WMC subjects showed less error interference than did 
lower-WMC subjects (but WMC did not predict RT interference). If there is a systematic 
relation between WMC and conflict resolution, the evidence from the single-conflict 
tasks suggests that this relation is not captured through use of the Kornblum taxonomy. I 
used the single-conflict tasks to determine whether the results from Experiments 1 and 
2A were due to having two conflict types within one task. The trials from the up-down 
arrows task most closely map onto to the S-S conflict trials and the Simon trials most 
closely map onto the S-R conflict trials from the earlier experiments. The results from the 
up-down arrows task were somewhat consistent with the S-S conflict results from 
Experiment 1 and 2A, with higher-WMC subjects showing a non-significant advantage 
over lower-WMC subjects. The results from the Simon task were consistent with 
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Experiment 1 and 2A, insofar as higher-WMC subjects showed no advantage over lower-
WMC subjects, but there was no evidence for higher-WMC subjects being at a 
disadvantage on these trials. This latter result suggests that having to resolve two types of 
conflict may have helped produce the greater error interference by higher-WMC subjects 
in Experiments 1 and 2A. Perhaps in the dual-conflict scenario, higher-WMC subjects 
bias their attention away from the vertical location, but this somehow leaves them 
vulnerable to the response-conflicting horizontal location. The consistency between the 
results from the up-down arrows and Simon tasks with the patterns observed in the earlier 
experiments suggests that the dissociation found in Experiments 1 and 2A was not solely 
due to S-S and S-R conflict being delivered within the same task. 
Latent Variable Analyses 
In my proposal of this experiment, models using latent variables were planned to 
test whether the S-S and S-R interference effects being measured here were markers of 
generalizable cognitive processes that could be detected with subjects showing consistent 
advantages or disadvantages with specific conflict types across tasks. A matrix of 
correlations was produced by calculating a residualized conflict score for each observed 
measure of interest from each task (see Table 9). For example, in the joystick replication 
task, each subject’s incongruent RT on S-S trials was regressed on his or her congruent 
RT on S-S trials. The residual from this linear model was kept as the dependent variable 
representing S-S interference. Residualized interference scores were chosen over simple 
difference scores (i.e., incongruent RT – congruent RT) or ratios (i.e., incongruent RT / 
congruent RT) because they tended to be less skewed, leptokurtic, or platykurtic. That 
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being said, in Experiment 3, variables produced with these various methods correlated 
strongly (rs > .90) and lead to the same conclusions. 
 As seen in Table 9, the correlation matrix produced from Experiment 3 indicated 
weak relations among measures of S-S interference and S-R interference. The 
correlations within conflict types (i.e., S-S and S-R) appeared to be no stronger than the 
weak relations across S-S and S-R conflict measures, suggesting that behavioral measures 
of S-S interference and S-R interference are task-dependent and do not represent stable 
across-task individual differences. The reliabilities of the Experiment 3 tasks (calculated 
by correlating residualized interference scores from even-numbered trials with those from 
odd-numbered trials) were low, with few exceptions (reported on the diagonal of Table 
9), limiting the potential strength of any correlations between tasks.  
Although the correlation matrix and reliabilities were not encouraging, in 
accordance with my a priori analysis plan, I attempted to fit the Experiment 3 data to the 
proposed latent variable model. In this confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) model, three 
latent variables were specified. One latent variable represented the construct of WMC, 
another latent variable represented the construct of S-S interference, and the third 
construct was S-R interference. If the constructs represented consistent covariances 
among subjects, then I would have a model that allowed estimates of the relations among 
WMC, S-S interference, and S-R interference at the construct level. Not surprisingly, in 
light of the correlations and reliabilities, this model failed to converge, yielding no 
interpretable results. 
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I constructed another model, taking a bi-factor approach, and using raw RTs 
rather than residuals as dependent measures (see Table 10 for the correlation matrix). In 
this model, all congruent and incongruent RT measures loaded onto a general RT factor, 
RTs from incongruent S-S trials also loaded onto an S-S interference factor, incongruent 
S-R trial RTs onto an S-R interference factor, and WMC task measures onto a WMC 
factor. Global fit statistics provide estimates of how well the covariances in the data 
match the model. The comparative fit index (CFI) measures the relative improvement in 
the conducted model against a model that assumes no covariances among the observed 
model (the baseline or independence model). A CFI greater than .90 indicates acceptable 
model fit (Kline, 1998). The bi-factor model converged, but it had a CFI of only .48, 
indicating an unacceptable fit of the model to the data. The standardized root mean 
square residual (SRMR) and the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) 
index the differences between predicted and observed covariances; values of less than .08 
indicate acceptable fit (Kline, 1998). Here, the model yielded a SRMR of .16 and a 
RMSEA of .28. From the correlation matrix, the failure of the model of the residualized 
interference effects to converge, and the poor fits from the bi-factor model, all signs 
pointed to the fact that, when attempting to group all of the S-S- and S-R-specific 
variances across the tasks in Experiment 3, there was too much task-specific variance to 
make meaningful, coherent groupings. In addition to the CFA models presented above, I 
tested separate models for single and dual-conflict tasks model (using the residual 
scores), a model using the raw RTs that had a general RT factor where all RTs were 
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loaded and a general interference factor that was composed of only the incongruent RTs, 
regardless of conflict type. None of these models provided acceptable fits to the data. 
To complement the CFAs, I conducted exploratory factor analyses (EFA) on both 
the residualized interference scores and the raw RTs. The purpose of the EFAs was to 
examine, from a bottom-up perspective, whether there was an underlying structure to the 
RT data that was being missed in my confirmatory analyses. For each of these EFAs, 
parallel analysis was used to determine how many factors to select (Humphreys & 
Montanelli, 1975). Factor extraction with parallel analysis is preferred over methods 
using scree plots or eigenvalues because it uses a Monte Carlo simulation to extract 
values, avoiding the subjectivity and insensitivity found when using scree plots or 
eigenvalues to extract factors (Glorfeld, 1995; Zwick & Velicer, 1986). The parallel 
analysis on the residualized data set suggested 4 factors, while the parallel analysis on the 
raw RTs suggested 5 factors. The EFAs were performed with maximum likelihood 
estimation and an oblomin rotation to allow the factors to correlate. 
 Table 11 shows the factor loadings from the EFA on the residualized interference 
scores. The first extracted factor shows a high loading from the numerosity task and weak 
loadings from all other tasks. The second factor shows a moderate loading from the S-R 
portion of the joystick replication task and weak loadings from all other measures. The 
third factor shows a moderate loading from S-S trials from the Up-Down Numerosity 
Task with weak loading from all other measures. The fourth factor shows some weak to 
moderate loading from three of the single-conflict tasks (Up-Down Arrows, Simon, and 
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the Flanker). In total, the EFA on the residuals did not reveal any underlying structure 
(other than task-specificity). 
Table 12 presents the factor loadings for the EFA on the raw RTs. Here, we see a 
clearer picture of task-specific relations, with the first factor representing the up-down 
numerosity dual-conflict task, the second factor the joystick replication task, the third the 
axis-shifted task, the fourth the Simon task, and the fifth the flanker task. The numerosity 
task had a moderate loading on the first factor with the up-down numerosity task. This 
was not unexpected because the numerosity portion was the same on both tasks and these 
measures were moderately correlated. The same could be said for the up-down arrows 
task and the joystick replication task which share very similar S-S trials.  
Latent Variable Analyses Discussion 
In Experiment 3, I tested whether tasks designed with the Kornblum taxonomy in 
mind would produce reliable, consistent patterns of individual variation in conflict 
susceptibility (whether WMC-related or not). Specifically, patterns of covariation were 
examined to see if S-S conflict resolution measures related more strongly with one 
another across tasks compared to the relation between S-S and S-R conflict resolution 
measures (and vice versa for S-R conflict resolution measures). Here, the data were clear. 
S-S and S-R conflict resolution measures did not show patterns where S-S conflict 
measures shared more variance with each other than they did with S-R conflict measures. 
Conflict measures were strongly related when they were within the same task. The 
correlation matrix, along with failed and poorly fitting structural models, all point to this 
conclusion. The low reliabilities suggest that even on the intra-individual level, the 
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processes that combat interference are not consistently deployed or effective (or the 
measures used here are not sensitive enough to pick them up). One factor that may be 
working against picking up across-task variation is the strong within-task correlations 
between congruent and incongruent conditions (see Table 10).  
In any case, the lack of across-task covariation with conflict measures produced 
here does not appear to be a unique anomaly. In a neuroimaging context, Fan, Flombaum, 
McCandliss, Thomas, and Posner (2003) in four experiments had subjects complete 
variants of flanker tasks, a color-word Stroop task, and Simon tasks. Using functional 
magnetic resonance imaging, they detected common brain activations across tasks, but 
their behavioral measures were not related (except in one experiment where they 
modified a flanker and Stroop task to be very similar). In a behavioral context, although 
Keye et al. (2009) were able to get a CFA model of flanker and Simon tasks to converge 
(it fit the data well), the conflict factor for the flanker task correlated only weakly with 
the conflict factor from the Simon task (r = .14).  
Discussion 
The patterns of dual-conflict and single-conflict task results did not produce 
patterns consistent with the proposition (and in contrast to the findings from Experiment 
1 and 2A) that higher-WMC subjects are superior to lower-WMC subjects at resolving S-
S interference. Nor did higher-WMC subjects experience a consistent decrement in 
resolving S-R conflict in comparison with lower-WMC subjects. Latent variable analyses 
provided evidence that S-S and  S-R conflict  measures are either not reliably captured by 
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my behavioral measures or that S-S and S-R conflict measures are not generalizable 
beyond the task they are produced in. 
The delta plots from these tasks suggested some task-specificity in the time-
course of interference effects and, by extension, task-specificity in the processes used to 
counter this interference. Trials in which conflict was created by having arrow orientation 
conflict with arrow location (i.e., S-S trials in joystick replication, axis-shifted task, and 
the single-conflict up-down arrows task) produced a pattern where interference started off 
close to its asymptote and then descended as RTs slowed. The flanker task, which had 
irrelevant flanking arrows in conflict with the target arrow, produced a pattern where 
interference built over the first few RT bins and then descended. To put these S-S delta 
plots within some context, Unsworth et al. (2012) displayed a delta plot from a flanker 
and Stroop task that had interference ascending as RTs got longer. Pratte et al. (2010) 
also reported that interference increased as RTs got longer in multiple variants of manual 
Stroop tasks. 
In a review of Simon task (S-R conflict) delta plots, Proctor et al. (2011) found 
that when tasks were horizontally aligned and either required responses from both left 
and right hands (like the Simon task used here) or left and right movements of one hand 
(like the joystick replication task used here) descending patterns of interference as RTs 
lengthened were produced (see also Pratte et al., 2010). The single-conflict (prototypical) 
horizontal Simon task used here — with conflict between side of display and the key to 
be pressed — produced the expected descending pattern of interference as RTs got 
longer. The results from the S-R trials from the joystick replication task with its 
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ascending interference effects where S-R conflict was also on the horizontal axis suggests 
(along with the results from Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B) that mixing S-S and S-R tasks 
changes how subjects approach and therefore respond to conflict. Proctor et al. report that 
ascending interference patterns are found when the stimulus is presented on the vertical 
axis (or auditorily). Here, the vertically aligned S-R trials in axis-shifted task showed an 
ascending pattern of interference. In addition, the numerosity task also produced an 
ascending pattern of interference effects as RTs lengthened. 
The patterns of interference effects displayed by delta plots have been interpreted 
as reflecting the cognitive processes that are engaged in conflict resolution (Pratte et al., 
2010). For example, patterns of descending interference effects have been interpreted as 
markers of inhibition, where initial erroneous response activation has to be quelled by 
inhibition processes that take some time engage (Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, 
Winjen, & Burle, 2004). Regardless of the interpretations of specific patterns, if we 
operate under the assumption that the patterns of interference reflect specific conflict 
resolution processes, the heterogeneity of the patterns presented here speak to the 
heterogeneity of the processes involved. Of most importance for the current investigation, 
the heterogeneity of delta plots for forms of conflict that are the same in the terms of the 
Kornblum taxonomy suggest that the taxonomy may not be useful in understanding how 
people overcome conflict (for a similar conclusion see Pratte et al., 2010). 
In the dual-conflict tasks, congruency-sequence effects (in RTs or errors) were not 
found on trials where the conflict type switched. Robust congruency-sequence effects 
emerged, however, when the conflict-type repeated from trial-to-trial. The initial intent in 
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analyzing congruency-sequence effects was to examine them as markers of reactive 
control and as potential mediators of WMC-related differences in interference control. 
Higher-WMC subjects only experienced significantly less RT interference in the 
numerosity task. In the numerosity task, significant and substantial congruency-sequence 
effects were found with an estimate of a 27 ms reduction in interference following an 
incongruent trial compared to the amount of interference following a congruent trial. 
WMC did not moderate this effect. In the single-conflict up-down arrows task and in the 
up-down arrows portion of up-down numerosity task (where the WMC × RT interference 
parameters were both -3 ms in favor of higher-WMC subjects, but not significant [ts = 
1.5 and 1.9, respectively]), WMC did moderate RT congruency-sequence effects, with 
higher-WMC subjects showing less adjustment in congruency effects following 
incongruent trials than lower-WMC subjects. In the Simon task, where previous research 
has found relations between congruency-sequence effects and working memory capacity 
in RTs, no such relation was detected. However, WMC did predict the Simon 
congruency-sequence effects in errors. Higher-WMC subjects exhibited a greater 
adjustment in their performance following incongruent trials than lower-WMC subjects 
(b = -0.42, Z = 2.2). This finding sits in contrast to WMC × congruency-sequence effects 
found in prior investigations where lower-WMC subjects showed greater post-conflict 
adjustments (Keye et al., 2009, Weldon et al, 2013). 
 Found in every task, congruency-sequence effects are a robust a reliable 
phenomenon. What causes congruency-sequence effects is currently debated, with the 
top-down conflict-monitoring theory (Botvinick et al., 2001) most often pitted against the 
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bottom-up feature-integration account (Hommel, Proctor, & Vu, 2004; Mayr, Awh, & 
Laurey, 2003). Regardless of whether congruency-sequence effects are caused by top-
down or bottom-up processes, individual differences in the magnitude of these effects 
could shed light on how people approach or react to cognitive conflict. When WMC-
related individual differences in congruency-sequence effects are found, they do not 
appear to be related to overall WMC-related performance differences and therefore do 
not seem to hold promise in elucidating the mechanisms or processes that are responsible 
for WMC and its relation to higher-order cognition. 
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CHAPTER V 
GENERAL DISCUSSION 
The primary goal of this project was to add specificity to accounts of WMC-
related individual differences in conflict resolution – and our understanding of the 
executive control construct. Depending on which forms of conflict were sensitive to 
WMC-related individual differences, the findings would suggest a role for WMC in 
either resolving interference relatively early in the information-processing stream, at 
stimulus identification or selection (indicated by S-S conflict), or relatively late, at 
response selection (indicated by S-R conflict), or perhaps at both stages. If WMC 
predicted both S-S and S-R conflict resolution, then it may have indicated that WMC 
affects online conflict resolution processes at a more global level (e.g., superior goal 
maintenance or task approach). For example, higher-WMC subjects may better resolve 
all conflict (both S-S and S-R) because they have the task goal in a more activated state 
than lower-WMC subjects allowing for more efficient (or faster) conflict resolution 
processes downstream. If WMC predicted neither S-S nor S-R conflict resolution, it 
would suggest that the two-factor theory of cognitive control where WMC relates to 
attentional task performance through goal maintenance and conflict resolutions processes 
should be reexamined. 
Using a task that minimized contributions of goal-maintenance and task-switching 
abilities by presenting a single goal (attend to arrow shape and ignore arrow location) 
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that was frequently reinforced by conflict trials (Experiments 1 and 2A), I found that 
higher-WMC subjects experienced less S-S interference (in RTs) and more S-R 
interference (in errors) than did lower-WMC subjects. That is, in a scenario where the 
influence of goal-maintenance abilities was experimentally controlled, I found a 
dissociation in WMC’s prediction of S-S versus S-R conflict. In contrast, in a similar task 
that boosted the contribution of goal-maintenance abilities by presenting 80% congruent 
trials (and thereby did not externally reinforce the task goal of ignoring stimulus location; 
Experiment 2B), higher-WMC subjects were less vulnerable to both S-S and S-R 
interference than were lower-WMC subjects. These results appeared to support dual-
factor theories of cognitive control with proactive goal maintenance and reactive conflict 
resolution processes (e.g., Braver et al., 2007; Engle & Kane, 2004) and to add specificity 
to the account of WMC–control relations by defining a boundary condition. However, in 
Experiment 3, I attempted to address confounds presented in the earlier experiments and 
to test for the robustness and generality of the dissociation among WMC, S-S 
interference, and S-R interference. Experiment 3 results suggested that the dissociation 
seen earlier was task-specific, and therefore neither robust nor generalizable to other 
tasks and situations.  
WMC and S-S Interference 
In Experiment 1, 2A, and 2B, WMC did not significantly relate to errors caused 
by S-S conflict but, in these three experiments (and in both pure S-S trials and combined 
S-S/S-R trials in Experiment 1), higher-WMC subjects exhibited significantly less S-S 
interference in RTs than did lower-WMC subjects. WMC appeared to affect information 
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processing relatively early in the process, such as during stimulus identification or 
stimulus selection. It seemed, then, that higher-WMC subjects were better able than 
lower-WMC subjects to selectively attend to the response-relevant stimulus dimension 
(here, arrow shape/direction) while limiting processing of the irrelevant stimulus 
dimension (here, arrow location). This seemed to jibe well with previous work that has 
found performance benefits for higher-WMC subjects in other tasks that present S-S 
conflict (e.g., Stroop tasks [Kane & Engle, 2003; Hutchison, 2011; Long & Prat, 2002; 
Meier & Kane, 2013; Unsworth et al., 2012] and flanker tasks [Heitz & Engle, 2007; 
Redick & Engle, 2006]). In addition, this finding was appealing because it seemed to fit 
with recent work that has found an association between simple sensory discrimination 
and IQ (Melnick et al., 2013), where subjects who were better able to deploy sensory 
suppression mechanisms had higher IQs. These findings would seem to mesh together to 
offer a partial account of the strong relations between WMC and intelligence (Conway, 
Kane, & Engle, 2003). 
In Experiment 3, however, higher-WMC subjects did not consistently 
demonstrate an advantage over lower-WMC subjects in resolving S-S conflict. In three 
tasks that presented up-down arrows that were either congruent or incongruent with 
screen location (joystick replication, up-down arrows task, and the up-down arrows trials 
on the dual-conflict up-down arrows numerosity task), higher-WMC subjects showed a 
non-significant advantage over lower-WMC subjects in the amount of interference 
experienced (it is notable, however, that in the up-down numerosity task the t statistic 
was very close to significant [1.9] and the parameter estimate was similar to the 
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parameter estimates from Experiments 1 and 2A). When arrow direction and screen 
location were in conflict on the horizontal plane in the axis-shifted task, higher-WMC 
subjects were non-significantly slower and significantly more error prone in resolving S-
S interference than lower-WMC subjects (the same pattern as seen on the S-R trials in 
Experiment 1 and 2A). In the flanker task, where distractor arrows presented next to the 
target can interfere with the target arrow, higher-WMC subjects performed worse than 
lower-WMC subject in terms of error interference (no difference was observed in RT 
interference). The lack of a WMC-related advantage in the flanker task presented here (in 
Experiment 3), and the left-right arrows trials presented in the axis-shifted task, provide 
evidence that the previously observed relationships between WMC and tasks that 
presented S-S conflict cannot simply be explained by higher-WMC subjects being better 
able to generally handle S-S interference (see Table 13 for WMC × S-S interference 
parameter values across tasks). Indeed, recent research by Keye et al. (2009) has 
produced similar results, with higher-WMC subjects showing no benefit over lower-
WMC subjecs in flanker tasks. In light of these results, perhaps the earlier work that has 
provided evidence for higher-WMC subjects outperforming lower-WMC subjects in 
flanker tasks should be reconsidered. 
 Heitz and Engle (2007) who used the letters H and S as stimuli in a flanker task 
were able to produce their WMC-related differences by comparing subjects in the upper-
quaritle versus lower-quartile of their WMC distribution. Using progressively decreasing 
response deadlines, Heitz and Engle forced subjects to respond with a wide distribution 
of latencies. They examined accuracy over these latencies and found that there was 
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separation in accuracy between the higher and lower-WMC group in the middle of the 
RT distribution with the higher-WMC group being more accurate. Importantly, overall 
differences in the amount of RT interference were not found. Heitz and Engle thus 
provided evidence that higher-WMC subjects can restrict their attentional focus to the 
target faster than lower-WMC subjects, within a particular response window, but given 
the task-specific results presented here and elsewhere (Keye et al., 2009), it remains an 
open question whether that effect will generalize to other tasks that present S-S conflict. 
If  WMC-related individual differences are only evident when examining accuracy as a 
function of RT, and not when viewing overall measures of interference, it suggests that 
WMC may indeed affect processing in tasks using S-S interference but this processing 
difference has little (or no detectable) impact on typical task performance.   
Redick and Engle (2006) also found differences in flanker RT interference 
between  upper and lower quartile WMC groups, but their task used horizontal arrows as 
stimuli. An incongruent trial not only produced S-S interference, but also S-R 
interference because the responses were horizontally aligned keypresses. That is, arrows 
(i.e, the directions that the arrows are pointed) have been shown to produce S-R 
interference very similar to the interference that is generated between location and 
responses (Baldo, Shimamura, & Prinzmetal, 1998; Lu & Proctor, 2001) and in Redick 
and Engle the  horizontal arrow stimuli were either congruent or incongruent with the 
response. By presenting both types of conflict on single trial, Redick and Engle’s flanker 
task was a qualitatively different one than those presented here (where arrows and 
responses did not conflict). Moreover, Redick and Engle found their WMC-related 
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differences in RT interference on trials within the Attention Network Task (Fan, 
McCandliss, Sommer, Raz, & Posner, 2002) which, in addition to providing congruent 
and incongruent flanker trials, contained other manipulations. Subjects were presented 
with different cue types and the array of flanker stimuli appeared either above or below a 
fixation point to assess additional facets of attention —making this a complex task 
context clouding the interpretation of the WMC × interference relation. In a simpler task 
context without cues and moving stimulus arrays, but still using arrow stimuli, Unsworth 
and colleagues (Unsworth, Spillers, & Brewer, 2009; Unsworth, Redick, Spillers, & 
Brewer,2012) have found modest (but statistically significant) relations between WMC 
and flanker interference with higher-WMC subjects outperforming lower-WMC subjects. 
In addition to using horizontal arrow stimuli, Unsworth et al.’s subjects completed 150 
trials: 50 congruent, 50 incongruent, and 50 neutral trials (that just had horizontal lines 
with no arrow heads flanking the target). Because of this low proportion of incongruent 
trials, it is reasonable that this task may have measured goal maintenance as well as any 
conflict resolution processes. Keye et al. (2009) also used arrow flankers, but with a 50% 
proportion congruency (like the flanker task presented here), and did not find a 
significant relationship with WMC. 
Although the delta plots for all the S-S tasks  — except for the flanker task —  
presented similar patterns of  ascending interference effects (which previously has been 
interpreted  as evidence for a common process; Pratte et al., 2010), the  latent variable 
analyses conducted in Experiment 3 revealed that patterns of covariances did not not 
represent anything stable across tasks. That is, either the ability to resolve S-S conflict 
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was not a stable individual difference, or there was a stable construct but using RTs and 
errors in tasks like the ones used here did not provide the sensitivity necessary to measure 
it. Although a pattern of results indicating WMC relations with S-S conflict resolution 
was found in Experiment 1 and replicated in Experiment 2A, these results do not seem 
generalizable to S-S conflict produced in other task contexts. I wanted to learn what 
higher-WMC subjects are able to do that lower-WMC subjects are not. The pattern of 
results here does not enable me to do that to my satisfaction. It seems that higher-WMC 
subjects are able to deploy attention early to aid stimulus identification but only in 
specific situations. In situations where the interfering stimuli is more salient, like the 
flanker task, it appears that this advantage is negated.   
WMC and S-R Interference 
 In Experiments 1 and 2A, higher and lower-WMC subjects showed equivalent RT 
interference on S-R trials (with -3 ms per WMC standard deviation being the largest 
parameter value), but higher-WMC subjects showed significantly greater error 
interference than did lower-WMC subjects. Although the irrelevant stimulus dimension 
was arrow location for both S-S and S-R trials in these experiments, it seemed that 
whatever higher-WMC subjects were able to do to combat S-S interference was not 
helpful in resolving S-R interference. But in Experiment 3, with trials that presented 
conflict in the same way (i.e., irrelevant stimulus location conflicting with the response), 
that pattern was not replicated. In the joystick replication task, variation in WMC did not 
relate to RT interference, but it did predict error interference —in the opposite direction 
than what was observed in Experiments 1 and 2A. That is, in the joystick replication task, 
107 
 
higher-WMC subjects experienced less error interference than lower-WMC subjects. 
Because the response in this task was made via the joystick, it cannot be ruled out that the 
response type caused the results to differ from the early experiments which used two 
hands and keyboard responding. In the Simon task, however, which also caused conflict 
between the irrelevant stimulus location and the response location but used different 
stimuli from the arrow tasks, subjects responded with two hands by pressing the keys on 
the keyboard. Here, WMC did not predict RTs or errors, suggesting that there is more in 
play than just a distinction between joystick and button response modes (further 
suggesting that, perhaps, the significant WMC advantage in the joystick replication task 
was a fluke). When S-R conflict was shifted onto the vertical axis, WMC did not predict 
RT interference, but did predict error interference. Like Experiments 1 and 2A, higher-
WMC subjects experienced more error interference than lower-WMC subjects, but  
unlike those earlier experiments, higher-WMC subjects were less likely than lower-WMC 
subjects to make errors on  both congruent and incongruent S-R trials (in the earlier 
experiments WMC variation did not predict congruent trial performance).  
 With higher-WMC subjects only performing better than lower-WMC subjects on 
two S-R performance indices (joystick replication errors and numerosity RTs), it seems 
clear that higher-WMC subjects do not have a pronounced advantage over lower-WMC 
subjects in resolving interference between irrelevant stimulus locations and the location 
of the response. Regarding the RT interference effect in the numerosity task, the delta 
plot for this task (see Figure 26) showed an ascending pattern of interference, with 
separation between higher- and lower-WMC subjects on the trials with the slowest RTs. 
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Previously, a similar pattern has been interpreted as revealing WMC-related differences 
in goal maintenance processes (Unsworth et al., 2012; using Stroop and flanker tasks). 
The rationale being, in part, that lapses of goal maintenance have been shown to be 
related to RTs at the slow end of the distribution (McVay & Kane, 2012; Unsworth, 
Redick, Lakey, & Young, 2010). It is not clear why lapses of goal maintenance would 
show up in a 50% congruent numerosity task when there was no evidence of them in the 
other 50% congruency tasks. Therefore, I do not think goal maintenance abilities are a 
likely account for the WMC-related differences observed in the numerosity task. 
However, it does seem likely that lapses of goal maintenance can account for the WMC-
related performance differences  in Experiment 2B, with its high proportion of congruent 
trials (80%), higher-WMC subjects showed less RT interference than did lower-WMC 
subjects (-5 ms per WMC standard deviation) and equivalent error interference. The 
Experiment 2B results suggest that when goal-maintenance processes are made relevant 
to task success by the context, WMC can influence performance, with higher-WMC 
subjects outperforming lower-WMC subjects. 
WMC and Congruency-Sequence Effects 
 I examined congruency-sequence effects because they measure dynamic, reactive 
adjustments to experienced conflict. Prior work has theorized that higher-WMC subjects 
rely more on proactive control, while lower-WMC subjects have to default to a reactive 
strategy because they are not able to implement or maintain proactive control (Braver et 
al., 2007; Redick, 2014; Redick & Engle, 2011). Here, I tested whether these indicators 
of reactive control were moderated by WMC and, more importantly, whether 
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congruency-sequence effects mediated any WMC-performance relations. Robust 
congruency-sequence effects were found in every task, for both RTs and errors, when 
looking at trials where the conflict type repeated. In accordance with a vast majority of 
the literature (for an exception, see Kan et al., 2013), much weaker and mostly non-
significant congruency-sequence effects were found when the conflict type switched from 
trial-to-trial. The control engaged by one type of conflict was, therefore, specific and not 
helpful at resolving conflict created another way. 
 In prior work that has assessed whether WMC moderates congruency-sequence 
effects, the results have been mixed (Gulbinaite & Johnson, 2013; Keye et al., 2009, 
2013; Meier & Kane, 2013; Unsworth et al., 2012; Weldon et al., 2013). Using Stroop 
and flanker tasks (both involving at least some S-S conflict), Keye et al. (2009; 1 
experiment), Meier and Kane (2013; 2 experiments) and Unsworth et al. (2012; 2 
experiments) found no association between WMC and congruency-sequence effects. In 
Simon tasks (which only elicit S-R conflict), however, Gulbinaite and Johnson (2013; 1 
experiment); Keye et al. (2009; 1 experiment) and Weldon et al. (2013; 2 experiments) 
found that lower-WMC subjects exhibited more reactivity to the congruence of the prior 
trial when processing the current trial; Keye et al. (2013), in contrast, found no relations 
between a WMC latent variable and latent variable for congruency-sequence effects 
produced from horizontal and vertical Simon tasks.  
In my Experiment 3 when examining conflict-repeat trials, WMC significantly 
moderated RT congruency-sequence effects in two of the six S-S tasks and none of the 
six S-R tasks. In the two S-S tasks where WMC was related to RT congruency-sequence 
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effects, the up-down arrows single-conflict task and the up-down arrows trials in the up-
down numerosity dual-conflict tasks, higher-WMC subjects exhibited  less of an 
adjustment than did lower-WMC subjects in congruency effects after an incongruent trial. 
Consistent with the findings from experiments that have found WMC and congruency-
sequence relations, lower-WMC subjects made greater adjustments after conflict than 
higher-WMC subjects. Despite this consistency, these effects are not reliably found in 
either S-R or S-S conflict tasks. Currently, the balance of evidence seems to be against 
WMC-interference resolution relations (when found) being mediated by trial-to-trial 
adjustments of cognitive control. At this point, those few reported WMC-congruency 
sequence effect relations are probably best regarded as not providing critical information 
towards understanding how WMC impacts performance.  
Theoretical Implications 
The initial findings from Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B seemed to compliment recent 
work in visual search and auditory distraction that has established boundary conditions 
for the association between WMC and executive control (e.g., Poole & Kane, 2009; 
Sorqvist et al., 2013). That is, WMC appeared to be selectively related to the resolution 
of conflict that was created by the overlap of relevant and irrelevant stimulus features. 
However, the results from Experiment 3 suggested that the results from Experiments 1 
and 2A were the product of a specific task configuration and were not representative of 
general processes in the resolution of S-S and S-R interference. From previous work, it 
also appeared that WMC was more reliably related to some interference tasks than others. 
For example, WMC has been repeatedly shown to predict Stroop and flanker 
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performance, but less so to Simon task performance. I explored the possibility that the 
dissociating factor for when and where WMC predicts conflict task performance was 
dimensional overlap type. This does not seem to be the case. In fact, the findings from all 
three experiments considered together, along with recent work with the flanker task 
(Keye et al., 2009; 2013) and Simon task (Weldon et al., 2013), question the robustness 
of the overall relationship between WMC and performance on conflict tasks with 50% 
congruent trials.  
The two-factor theory of cognitive control (Engle & Kane, 2004) predicts that 
WMC affects performance through both goal maintenance and conflict resolution 
mechanisms (similar to Braver et al.’s [2007] conception of proactive and reactive 
control). Therefore we should see WMC × conflict task relations in tasks that produce 
interference but that do not put a premium on goal maintenance processes because of 
WMC’s relation to conflict resolution mechanisms. As shown in Table 13, in RTs, 
higher-WMC subjects did not consistently show advantages in terms of RT interference 
over lower-WMC subjects (3 out of 14 trial sets examined), nor did they do so in errors 
(2 out of 14 trial sets examined). Lower-WMC subjects did not show any advantages 
over higher-WMC subjects in the amount of RT interference experienced in any task, but 
they did show advantages in error interference over higher-WMC subjects in 5 out of 14 
trial sets examined (2 S-S tasks and 3 S-R tasks; see Table 13). The two-factor theory of 
cognitive control was primarily based on findings from Stroop (Kane & Engle, 2003; 
Meier & Kane, 2013) and antisaccade tasks (Kane, Bleckley, Conway, & Engle, 2001; 
Unsworth, Schrock, & Engle, 2004). For example, from the Stroop task (Kane & Engle, 
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2003), lower-WMC subjects committed more errors than higher-WMC subjects in high-
congruency contexts. This was considered evidence for lapses of goal maintenance by 
lower-WMC subjects. Interpreted as evidence for differences in conflict resolution, 
lower-WMC subjects were slower than higher-WMC subjects in low-congruency 
contexts.  
The two-factor theory of cognitive control may well explain WMC-related 
performance on the antisaccade, some Stroop tasks, and Experiments 1, 2A, and 2B, but 
it is not clear why the patterns predicted by the theory did not emerge from Experiment 3. 
Perhaps what has been previously found as support for the two factors is really just one 
—goal maintenance. Therefore, the findings reported here seem to be more in line with 
models of cognitive control that presented a tight coupling between goal maintenance and 
conflict resolution (Botvinick et al., 2001). However, the lack of a relation between 
WMC and congruency-sequence found here and elsewhere (Meier & Kane, 2013; Keye 
et al., 2009; Unsworth et al., 2012) does not fit with models that integrate goal 
maintenance and response competition. Congruency-sequence effects have been 
interpreted as reactive adjustments in cognitive control (Botvinick et al., 2001; Egner, 
2007). Therefore in tasks where higher-WMC subjects outperform lower-WMC subjects 
we should see WMC-related differences on congruency-sequence effects because the 
superior performance should either be attributable to better proactive goal maintenance or 
better reactive conflict resolution. On one hand, if the cause is better goal maintenance, 
then higher-WMC subjects should have smaller congruency-sequence effects than lower-
WMC subjects. On the other hand if the cause is better conflict resolution higher-WMC 
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subjects should show larger congruency-sequence effects than lower-WMC subjects. As 
stated previously, when WMC-related differences have been found, lower-WMC subjects 
have shown larger adjustments than higher-WMC subjects suggesting superior goal 
maintenance abilities by the higher-WMC subjects. But these WMC-related reactive 
adjustments have not been consistently found and when they are, they have not been 
shown to mediate task performance. Thus, the support from studies of WMC variation for 
models of cognitive control that propose tight integration between goal maintenance and 
conflict resolution processes is limited. 
WMC-related differences in low-congruency Stroop tasks have been one of the 
primary sources of evidence for WMC and conflict-resolution relations, but it may be that 
low-congruency tasks measure the activation state of the goal whereas 50% congruency 
tasks obscure both measures of goal maintenance and goal strength. My speculation on 
goal maintenance abilities and their role in the pattern of results seen is tempered by the 
low reliabilities observed in most of the measures used here. Low reliability will limit the 
strength of any potential relations. However, it is notable that in the Experiments 1, 2A, 
and 2B which produced consistent interpretable results, the reliability of the measures is 
not remarkably different than those observed in the Experiment 3 tasks (see Table 14). 
What is clear from the work presented here is that WMC-performance relations were not 
consistently related to the interference classifications derived from the Kornblum 
taxonomy across different tasks.  
Tasks (or trial sets) that were grouped together by the Kornblum taxonomy (e.g., 
numerosity trials, Simon trials, S-R trials with left-right arrows, and S-R trials with up-
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down arrows) also produced different patterns of interference effects depicted in the delta 
plots. In Dimensional Overlap theory, the amount of overlap between stimulus sets (and 
elements within those sets) affects the amount of interference produced, but there is 
nothing in the model that predicts why we would see an ascending pattern of interference 
effects in a numerosity task and the vertically-oriented S-R trials, but a descending 
pattern of interference in a Simon task. Although, in the Kornblum framework, these 
tasks are equivalent in the type of interference presented (S-R), if we work under the 
assumption that the time course of interference effects reflects underlying mechanisms 
used to counter the interference, these tasks do not seem to tap the same mechanism. This 
limits the utility of the Kornblum taxonomy because, although the taxonomy does 
describe on one dimension how interference is being caused, it seems to tell us little 
about how people resolve conflict.  
Moreover, the latent variable analyses provided strong evidence that the conflict 
tasks used here were not able to detect stable individual differences in information 
processing across tasks. The poor reliabilities from the conflict scores could indicate 
inconsistent ways of handling interference within individuals or that within-task 
correlations between congruent and incongruent trials (see Table 10) prohibit our ability 
to pick up on patterns of across-task covariation. In light of the heterogeneity of the time-
course of interference effects across tasks seen in the delta plots, I prefer an interpretation 
that combines both the within-subject and within-task explanations. That is, the low 
reliability scores were produced by task-related (and not WMC-related or conflict-type 
related) intrapersonal inconsistencies in the deployment of control processes.  
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 We may only consistently see WMC and attention relations in tasks that tax goal 
maintenance abilities therefore producing larger WMC-related performance differences. 
Prior work with latent variables that has shown robust associations between WMC and 
executive attention have included conflict measures in their executive attention latent 
factor (Unsworth & Spillers, 2010; McVay & Kane, 2012; Shipstead, Lindsay, Marshall, 
& Engle, 2014). Notably, in all of these investigations the conflict tasks presented at least 
66% congruent trials –stressing goal maintenance abilities. Yet, even with this high 
proportion of congruent trials, measures from these tasks often load weakly onto their 
respective latent variables. Without their emphasis on goal maintenance abilities, I 
suggest these tasks would load even more weakly. If WMC and attention task relations 
can be boiled down to just proactive, goal-maintenance abilities, some specificity in the 
WMC and attention relations will be achieved. Future work using latent variable analyses 
should test this hypothesis by probing for a latent goal maintenance factor across a 
diverse array of tasks with low, medium, and high proportion congruencies. If high and 
low proportion congruency tasks tap goal maintenance and strength factors respectively 
they should either load onto the same latent factor or separate latent factors that have a 
moderate to high correlation while the medium proportion congruency tasks should not 
load well on either latent factor.  
Conclusions  
From the evidence provided here, it appears that the relationship between 
attentional (or executive) control and WMC is in need of further scrutiny to determine 
how and under what circumstances WMC interfaces with cognitive control. A meta-
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analytic approach to examining WMC-attentional control relations in the literature could 
provide an estimate of the overall relation between the constructs. However, this task will 
be complicated because a majority of the earlier work demonstrating the relationship used 
extreme group designs (e.g., upper quartile vs. lower quartile) which result in inflated 
effect sizes (Preacher, Rucker, MacCallum, & Nicewander, 2005). Therefore, it will be 
most helpful if all future work investigating WMC and executive control relations uses 
designs that accurately represent the continuous nature of the WMC construct and 
provides more accurate effect sizes. A meta-analysis with the use of funnel-plots may 
also be able to provide evidence of a file-drawer effect in investigating these relations. 
Perhaps, the file drawer is obscuring our ability to view the full pattern of how WMC 
relates to tasks that require attentional control. 
The work here highlights that all interference is not the same — a point 
understood by many but nonetheless worth repeating — and researchers should be 
guarded when making broad claims based on results from one or two tasks. In addition, 
the present studies exemplify the utility of both direct and conceptual replications. 
Experiment 2A was (almost) a direct replication of Experiment 1. Experiment 2A 
confirmed the findings of Experiment 1 that in a task which displays up-down arrows at 
different screen locations higher-WMC subjects are better than lower-WMC subjects at 
handling one type of interference but perform worse than lower-WMC subjects at 
handling another type. The working hypothesis after Experiment 2A was that WMC has 
unique relations to both S-S interference (e.g., higher-WMC produces better 
performance) and S-R interference (e.g., higher-WMC produces worse performance). 
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The failed conceptual replications in Experiment 3 provide strong evidence that factors 
(e.g., goal maintenance abilities) other than (or in addition to) dimensional overlap must 
have produced the interaction with WMC that led to performance differences
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APPENDIX A 
 
  TABLES AND FIGURES 
 
Table 1 
 
       
Experiment 1 Descriptive Statistics 
          
Trial Category/DV Trial Type M Std Err Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Pure/RT S-R congruent 457 4 310 629 0.48 -0.16 
 
S-R incongruent 502 4 351 708 0.46 -0.16 
 
S-S congruent 471 4 322 633 0.41 -0.32 
 
S-S incongruent 509 4 376 742 0.63 0.24 
Pure/ER S-R congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.16 1.64 3.59 
 
S-R incongruent 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.48 1.16 1.94 
 
S-S congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.50 2.60 
 
S-S incongruent 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.49 1.53 4.68 
Combination/RT S-R con/ S-S con 453 4 283 646 0.36 -0.26 
 
S-R incon/S-S con 480 4 342 666 0.58 0.08 
 
S-R con/S-S incon 490 5 324 749 0.66 0.51 
 
S-R incon/S-S incon 516 4 373 791 0.68 0.75 
Combination/ER S-R con/S-S con 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.20 1.78 3.56 
 
S-R incon /S-S con 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.25 1.31 1.41 
 
S-R con/S-S incon 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.38 1.31 2.04 
 
S-R incon/S-S incon 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.50 0.96 1.40 
137 
 
Note: DV = dependent variable; M = mean of subject means; ER = error rate; RT = 
response time; Std Err = standard error; S-S = stimulus-stimulus; S-R = stimulus-
response; Con = congruent; Incon = incongruent. 
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Table 2 
       Experiment 2A Descriptive Statistics 
DV Trial Type M Std Err Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
RT S-R congruent 477 5 351 662 0.44 0.28 
 
S-R incongruent 520 6 384 733 0.51 0.36 
 
S-S congruent 493 6 343 683 0.27 -0.14 
 
S-S incongruent 528 6 404 710 0.36 -0.23 
ER S-R congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 1.18 0.78 
 
S-R incongruent 0.13 0.01 0.01 0.38 0.74 -0.10 
 
S-S congruent 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.14 0.79 
 
S-S incongruent 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.29 0.94 0.79 
Note: DV = dependent variable; M = mean of subject means; RT = response time; ER = 
error rate; Std Err = standard error; S-S = stimulus-stimulus; S-R = stimulus-response. 
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Table 3 
       Experiment 2B Descriptive Statistics 
DV Trial Type M Std Err Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
RT S-R congruent 435 5 338 602 0.69 0.23 
 
S-R incongruent 518 7 376 711 0.44 -0.13 
 
S-S congruent 455 6 350 661 0.71 0.46 
 
S-S incongruent 522 7 393 782 0.69 0.75 
ER S-R congruent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.11 1.59 2.93 
 
S-R incongruent 0.26 0.01 0.04 0.60 0.56 0.10 
 
S-S congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.99 0.68 
 
S-S incongruent 0.16 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.90 0.47 
Note: DV = dependent variable; M = mean of subject means; RT = response time; ER = 
error rate; Std Err = standard error; S-S = stimulus-stimulus; S-R = stimulus-response. 
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Table 4 
  Experiment 3 Task Order for the Two Sessions 
  Session 1 Session 2 
1) Operation Span Flanker 
2) Joystick Replication Divergent Thinking 
3) Divergent Thinking Symmetry Span 
4) Fluid Intelligence Up-Down Numerosity 
5) Divergent Thinking Divergent Thinking 
6) Numerosity Fluid Intelligence 
7) Fluid Intelligence Axis -shifted Joystick 
8) Up-Down Arrows Fluid Intelligence 
9) Updating Reading Span 
10) Simon   
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Table 5 
      Correlation Matrix for Experiment 3 Working Memory Measures 
  OSPAN SSPAN RSPAN Updating 
  OSPAN 0.81 
     SSPAN 0.44 0.70 
    RSPAN 0.43 0.40 0.73 
   Updating 0.39 0.25 0.28 0.85 
  Note: Values on the diagonal reflect Cronbach’s alpha for each measure as a reliability 
estimate; alphas were calculated from proportion recall on every trial (Redick et al., 
2012). OSPAN = Operation Span; SSPAN = Symmetry Span; RSPAN = Reading Span 
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Table 6   
Experiment 3 Descriptive Statistics for Working Memory Measures 
  M SD Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
 OSPAN 54.2 13.0 6 74 -0.96 0.68 
 SSPAN 28.6 7.3 7 42 -0.54 -0.05 
 RSPAN 36.4 10.4 9 58 -0.24 -0.57 
 Updating 0.41 0.16 0.08 0.92 0.41 -0.24 
 Note: OSPAN = Operation Span; SSPAN = Symmetry Span; RSPAN = Reading Span 
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Table 7  
  
            
Experiment 3  Dual-Conflict  Task Descriptive Statistics     
Task DV Trial Type M Std Err Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Joystick Rep RT S-R congruent 492 9 327 847 1.28 1.75 
 
 
S-R incongruent 537 10 343 904 1.35 1.72 
 
 
S-S congruent  525 9 352 1043 1.57 3.92 
 
 
S-S incongruent 556 10 372 1247 2.14 8.28 
 ER S-R congruent 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.32 3.82 22.88 
 
 
S-R incongruent 0.14 0.01 0.00 0.62 1.09 1.31 
 
 
S-S congruent  0.05 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.02 0.35 
  S-S incongruent 0.07 0.01 0.00 0.30 1.18 0.99 
Axis-Shifted RT S-R congruent 541 7 365 864 0.94 0.83 
  S-R incongruent 577 8 342 1433 2.06 10.83 
  S-S congruent  567 7 341 999 1.06 1.65 
  S-S incongruent 586 7 292 964 1.08 1.81 
  S-R congruent 0.13 0.01 0.00 0.66 1.38 1.83 
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  S-R incongruent 0.19 0.01 0.00 0.59 0.69 -0.33 
  S-S incongruent 0.15 0.01 0.00 0.56 1.15 0.84 
UDN RT S-R congruent 485 4 364 683 0.39 -0.25 
  S-R incongruent 523 5 371 719 0.21 -0.59 
  S-S congruent  512 5 365 689 0.25 -0.59 
  S-S incongruent 531 5 390 750 0.29 -0.36 
 ER S-R congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.26 2.39 7.76 
  S-R incongruent 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.40 1.28 1.74 
  S-S congruent  0.06 0.00 0.00 0.29 1.85 4.00 
   S-S incongruent 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.39 1.52 3.33 
Note: DV = dependent variable; M = mean of subject means; RT = response time; ER = 
error rate; Std Err = standard error; S-S = stimulus-stimulus; S-R = stimulus-response. 
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Table 8 
        Experiment 3 Single-Conflict Task Descriptive Statistics 
Task DV 
Trial 
Congruency M 
Std 
Err Min Max Skew Kurtosis 
Numerosity RT Congruent 455 4 332 640 0.64 0.20 
  
Incongruent 513 5 336 758 0.51 0.09 
 
ER Congruent 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.15 1.82 4.02 
  
Incongruent 0.11 0.01 0.00 0.55 1.96 6.83 
Simon RT Congruent 439 3 319 607 0.46 0.43 
  
Incongruent 463 3 348 621 0.44 0.06 
 
ER Congruent 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.22 1.27 2.24 
  
Incongruent 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.40 1.29 2.33 
Flanker RT Congruent 445 3 348 632 1.01 1.51 
  
Incongruent 492 3 390 647 0.43 0.13 
 
ER Congruent 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.17 1.68 3.35 
  
Incongruent 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.38 1.20 1.49 
UD Arrows RT Congruent 482 4 351 648 0.43 -0.11 
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Incongruent 501 4 381 681 0.38 -0.05 
 
ER Congruent 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.18 1.15 1.11 
   Incongruent 0.07 0.00 0.00 0.35 1.54 3.15 
Note: DV = dependent variable; M = mean of subject means; RT = response time; ER = 
error rate; Std Err = standard error; S-S = stimulus-stimulus; S-R = stimulus-response; 
UD = Up-Down. 
 
 
 
  
147 
 
Table 9 
          Correlation Matrix for Residual Scores 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
 1. Flanker (S-S) 0.65 
         2. Axis-Shifted S-S -0.02 0.38 
        3. Up-Down (S-S) 0.12 0.04 0.48 
       4. Joystick Rep S-S 0.04 0.06 0.17 0.35 
      5. UDN S-S -0.05 -0.03 0.21 0.12 0.37 
     6. Axis-Shifted S-R 0.12 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.96 
    7. Numerosity (S-R) 0.06 -0.01 0.03 0.05 0.04 -0.07 0.48 
   8. Simon (S-R) 0.15 0.04 0.22 0.07 0.12 0.06 0.10 0.47 
  9. Joystick Rep S-R 0.12 0.19 0.10 0.14 -0.02 0.13 0.17 0.17 0.89 
 10. UDN S-R -0.05 0.05 -0.02 0.05 0.08 0.00 0.35 -0.02 0.16 0.66 
Note: Values on the diagonal reflect Cronbach’s alpha for each measure as a reliability estimate; 
alphas were calculated from residual scores on odd and even trials. Up-Down = Up-Down 
Arrows Task; Joystick Rep = Joystick Replication Task; UDN = Up-Down Numerosity Task; S-S 
= Stimulus-Stimulus Conflict; S-R = Stimulus-Response Conflict.
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Table 10 
          Correlation Matrix for WMC Scores and Response Times 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1. OSPAN 1 
         2. SSPAN 0.44 1 
        3. RSPAN 0.43 0.40 1 
       4. Updating 0.39 0.25 0.28 1 
      5. Flanker Con -0.17 -0.17 -0.13 -0.22 1 
     6. Flanker Incon -0.17 -0.22 -0.12 -0.19 0.89 1 
    7. Axis-Shifted S-S Con -0.02 -0.04 -0.14 -0.15 0.33 0.30 1 
   8. Axis-Shifted S-S  Incon 0.00 -0.03 -0.09 -0.16 0.38 0.34 0.95 1 
  8. Axis-Shifted S-R  Con 0.02 -0.03 -0.11 -0.15 0.37 0.31 0.89 0.91 1 
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8. Axis-Shifted S-R  Incon 0.00 0.00 -0.05 -0.12 0.35 0.33 0.88 0.90 0.77 1 
11. Numerosity Con -0.09 -0.11 -0.05 -0.18 0.48 0.45 0.40 0.44 0.39 0.38 
12. Numerosity Incon -0.07 -0.16 -0.08 -0.17 0.45 0.44 0.36 0.40 0.35 0.33 
13. Simon Con -0.11 -0.02 -0.02 -0.20 0.48 0.42 0.30 0.30 0.31 0.26 
14. Simon Incon -0.12 -0.06 -0.04 -0.25 0.48 0.46 0.31 0.32 0.33 0.29 
15. Up-Down Con -0.09 -0.16 -0.08 -0.20 0.63 0.56 0.41 0.43 0.43 0.36 
16. Up-Down Incon -0.12 -0.18 -0.11 -0.24 0.62 0.57 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.38 
17. Joystick Rep S-S Con 0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.17 0.40 0.32 0.48 0.51 0.52 0.35 
18. Joystick Rep S-S Incon -0.01 0.01 -0.05 -0.20 0.43 0.36 0.48 0.50 0.51 0.36 
19, Joystick Rep S-R Con 0.00 0.03 -0.05 -0.17 0.43 0.33 0.50 0.51 0.53 0.38 
20. Joystick Rep S-R Incon 0.02 0.01 -0.02 -0.18 0.41 0.33 0.49 0.51 0.51 0.38 
21. UDN S-S Con 0.02 -0.10 -0.02 -0.13 0.57 0.53 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.56 
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22. UDN S-S Incon -0.01 -0.12 -0.01 -0.17 0.58 0.53 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.55 
23. UDN S-R Con 0.00 -0.11 -0.02 -0.17 0.59 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.52 0.54 
24. UDN S-R Incon 0.01 -0.13 -0.02 -0.18 0.60 0.55 0.53 0.57 0.51 0.54 
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11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              
              1 
             0.91 1 
            0.56 0.54 1 
           0.61 0.60 0.88 1 
          0.65 0.60 0.62 0.65 1 
         0.64 0.60 0.59 0.66 0.93 1 
        
 
 
  
1
5
2
 
0.47 0.47 0.44 0.48 0.62 0.64 1 
       0.51 0.50 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.66 0.96 1 
      0.47 0.44 0.42 0.46 0.61 0.64 0.94 0.92 1 
     0.51 0.49 0.45 0.50 0.62 0.65 0.95 0.94 0.95 1 
    0.69 0.64 0.42 0.47 0.63 0.62 0.47 0.49 0.46 0.46 1 
   0.69 0.65 0.44 0.50 0.62 0.64 0.47 0.50 0.47 0.47 0.96 1 
  0.69 0.63 0.43 0.49 0.61 0.62 0.47 0.49 0.47 0.47 0.97 0.97 1 
 0.70 0.68 0.46 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.49 0.51 0.47 0.48 0.95 0.96 0.96 1 
Note: OSPAN = Operation Span; SSPAN = Symmetry Span; RSPAN = Reading Span; Con = Congruent; Incon = Incongruent; Rep = 
Replication; UDN = Up-Down Numerosity Task; S-S = Stimulus-stimulus; S-R = Stimulus-response
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Table 11 
    Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis on Response Time Residuals 
Dependent Variable Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
Flanker S-S 0.07 0.06 -0.11 0.41 
Axis-shifted S-S  -0.10 0.34 0.00 -0.08 
Axis-shift S-R  -0.13 0.21 0.10 0.10 
Numerosity S-R  0.98 -0.01 0.00 0.01 
Simon S-R  0.07 0.12 0.15 0.35 
Up-Down Arrows S-S  -0.01 0.07 0.34 0.32 
Joystick Replication S-S -0.02 0.19 0.22 0.05 
Joystick Replication S-R  0.00 0.67 -0.03 0.03 
UDN Arrows S-S  0.00 -0.05 0.62 -0.03 
UDN Arrows S-R  0.28 0.22 0.12 -0.28 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 are bolded to indicate a moderate to high loading; UDN = 
Up-Down Arrow Numerosity Task; S-S = Stimulus-Stimulus; S-R = Stimulus-Response. 
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Table 12 
     Factor Loadings for Exploratory Factor Analysis on Raw Response Times
Trial Type Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5 
Flanker Congruent -0.01 0.03 0.00 -0.02 0.99 
Flanker Incongruent 0.02 -0.05 0.02 0.03 0.88 
Axis-shifted S-S Congruent -0.01 0.03 0.96 0.02 -0.04 
Axis-shifted S-S Incongruent 0.01 0.03 0.97 -0.01 0.01 
Axis-shifted S-R Congruent -0.05 0.10 0.88 0.01 0.03 
Axis-shifted S-R Incongruent 0.08 -0.14 0.92 0.01 0.03 
Numerosity Congruent 0.50 0.09 0.00 0.36 -0.03 
Numerosity Incongruent 0.47 0.11 -0.03 0.37 -0.04 
Simon Congruent  -0.06 -0.02 0.04 0.92 0.05 
Simon Incongruent  0.02 0.02 0.01 0.93 0.00 
Up-Down Arrows Congruent  0.19 0.29 -0.02 0.33 0.25 
Up-Down Arrows Incongruent  0.20 0.33 -0.01 0.31 0.22 
Joystick Replication S-S Congruent 0.02 0.99 0.00 -0.01 -0.03 
Joystick Replication S-S Incongruent 0.03 0.94 -0.01 0.01 0.01 
Joystick Replication S-R Congruent -0.02 0.97 0.03 -0.04 0.04 
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Joystick Replication S-R Incongruent -0.01 0.96 0.03 0.03 -0.02 
Up-Down Numerosity S-S Congruent 0.98 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.00 
Up-Down Numerosity S-S Incongruent 0.98 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 
Up-Down Numerosity S-R Congruent 0.97 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.03 
Up-Down Numerosity S-R Incongruent 0.94 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.03 
Note: Factor loadings over .40 are bolded to indicate a moderate to high loading. S-S = Stimulus-
stimulus; S-R = Stimulus-response. 
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Table 13 
    Working Memory Capacity and Interference Interaction Model Parameters and Test 
Statistics 
 
 
Conflict
t 
Task WMC × RT Int (t Value) WMC × Err Int (Z Value) 
vvVValue) S-S E 1 -7 ms (5.1) 0.06 (1.1) 
 
E2A -4 ms (2.4) 0.05 (1.0) 
 
Joystick Replication  -5 ms (1.8) 0.01 (0.2) 
 
Axis Shifted 3 ms (1.0) 0.08 (2.1) 
 
UDN  -3 ms (1.9) -0.01 (0.9) 
 
Up-Down Arrows -3 ms (1.5) -0.15 (2.1) 
 
Flanker 1 ms (1.0) 0.25 (3.0) 
S-R E 1 -3 ms (0.9) 0.13 (2.3) 
 
E2A -1 ms (0.7) 0.19 (3.3) 
 
Joystick Replication  -1 ms (0.3) -0.17 (2.7) 
 
Axis Shifted 2 ms (0.6) 0.08 (2.2) 
 
UDN  -2 ms (1.4) -0.01 (0.2) 
 
Numerosity -6 ms (3.4) 0.18 (1.3) 
 Simon -2 ms (1.4) -0.06 (0.8) 
Note: The WMC × Error Interference parameter is reported as log odds ratio. S-S = 
Stimulus-Stimulus; S-R = Stimulus-Response; ms = milliseconds; Err = Errors; Int = 
Interference; RT = Response Time; E = Experiment; UDN = Up-Down Numerosity. 
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Table 14 
Reliabilities and Standard Errors for Residual Scores for All Trial Types in All 
Experiments 
Trial Type Cronbach α Standard Error 
Experiment 1 S-S RT 0.28 0.11 
Experiment 1 S-R RT 0.65 0.06 
Experiment 1 S-S ER 0.54 0.07 
Experiment 1 S-R ER 0.68 0.05 
Experiment 2A S-S RT 0.56 0.08 
Experiment 2A S-R RT 0.73 0.06 
Experiment 2A S-S ER 0.47 0.09 
Experiment 2A S-R ER 0.84 0.03 
Experiment 2B S-S RT 0.54 0.11 
Experiment 2B S-R RT 0.54 0.08 
Experiment 2B S-S ER 0.47 0.13 
Experiment 2B S-R ER 0.68 0.08 
Joystick Replication S-S RT  0.35 0.10 
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Joystick Replication S-R RT 0.89 0.02 
Joystick Replication S-S ER  0.49 0.08 
Joystick Replication S-R ER 0.84 0.02 
Axis-shifted  S-S RT 0.38 0.10 
Axis-shifted S-R RT 0.96 0.01 
Axis-shifted S-S ER 0.20 0.12 
Axis-shifted S-R ER 0.91 0.01 
UDN S-S RT  0.37 0.09 
UDN S-R RT  0.66 0.03 
UDN S-S ER 0.00 0.00 
UDN S-R ER 0.00 0.00 
Flanker RT 0.65 0.05 
Flanker ER 0.57 0.07 
Up-down Arrows RT 0.48 0.07 
Up-down Arrows ER 0.45 0.08 
Simon RT 0.47 0.08 
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Simon ER 0.49 0.07 
Numerosity RT 0.48 0.07 
Numerosity ER 0.63 0.05 
Note: Reliabilities calculated on residual scores from odd and even trials. S-S = Stimulus-
stimulus; S-R = Stimulus-response; RT = response time; ER = Error Rate; UDN = Up-
down Arrows/Numerosity
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Figure 1. Eight Possible Stimulus Positions in Experiment 1. Figure not to scale. 
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Figure 2. Experiment 1 Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference (Incongruent 
RTs/Errors – Congruent RTs/Errors) from Pure Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score 
(WMCz) in Response Times (RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.  
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Figure 3. Experiment 1 (E1) Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference from 
Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in Response Times 
(RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 4. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S ) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 5. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 1. 
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Figure 6. Experiment 2A Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response(S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference from 
Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in Response Times 
(RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
S-R 
 
S-S 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
-1 0 1
In
te
rf
e
re
n
ce
  (
In
co
n
gr
u
e
n
t 
R
T-
 
C
o
n
gr
u
e
n
t 
R
T
) 
WMCz 
S-S 
 
S-R 
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
-1 0 1I
n
te
rf
er
en
ce
  (
In
co
n
gr
u
en
t 
lo
g 
o
d
d
s-
 
C
o
n
gr
u
en
t 
lo
g 
o
d
d
s)
 
WMCz 
 
 
 
1
6
6
 
 
Figure 7. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 2A. 
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Figure 8. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in  Experiment 2A
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 a) RTs        b) Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Experiment 2A Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference from 
Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in Response Times 
(RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 10. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 2B. 
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Figure 11. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 2B.
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         a) RTs        b) Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Experiment 3 Joystick Replication Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) 
Interference from Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in 
Response Times (RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 13. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 3 Joystick Replication task. 
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Figure 14. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 3 Joystick Replication task.
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 a) RTs        b) Errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15. Experiment 3 Axis-shifted task Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) 
Interference from Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in 
Response Times (RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 16. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 Axis-shifted task. 
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Figure 17. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 Axis-shifted task.
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 a) RTs        b) Errors  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 18. Experiment 3 Up-down Numerosity task Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) and Stimulus-Stimulus (S-
S) Interference from Combination S-S/S-R Trials as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in 
Response Times (RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 19. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC)in Experiment 3 Up-Down Numerosity task. 
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Figure 20. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in Experiment 3 Up-Down Numerosity task
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Figure 21. Experiment 3 Single-conflict task Model Parameters of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in Response Times (RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted 
lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 22. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 single-conflict up-down arrows task. 
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Figure 23. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Stimulus (S-S) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 Single-Conflict Flanker task
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Figure 24. Experiment 3 Single-Conflict task Model Parameters of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference (Incongruent 
RTs/Errors – Congruent RTs/Errors) as a Function of Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMCz) in Response 
Times ( RTs; panel A) and Errors (panel B). The dotted lines represent the standard error of the estimate.
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Figure 25. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 single-conflict Simon task. 
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Figure 26. Delta Plot of Stimulus-Response (S-R) Interference as a Function of Upper (High) and Lower (Low) Tercile of 
Composite Working Memory Capacity Z-score (WMC) in the Experiment 3 single-conflict Numerosity task. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. All analyses were also run with mapping covariates, in these analyses none of the 
parameters of interest changed. This is not surprising because the LMMs are 
random intercept models. The random intercept accounts for between-subject 
variation in RTs.  
 
 
 
 
